Military Intelligence
## PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

the

FROM THE EDITOR

MIPB is pleased to present this issue, "The MI NCO." In dedicating an issue to the roles that enlisted soldiers, especially noncommissioned officers (NCOs), play in MI operations around the world, we hope to show that NCOs truly are the "backbone" of the MI Corps, as they are the "backbone" of the Army. Since the authors of more than half of our features are MI NCOs on active duty, they are the "backbone" of this **MIPB** as well!

Several of our departments also focus on the MI NCO. In the July-September 1997 issue, we introduced the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Master Analyst Program-focused "Sly Fox Den"; the AMAP trains senior NCOs to be unit experts on ASAS. In this issue, we introduce another new department, "Quick Tips," that provides our readers a forum to share short descriptions of "helpful hints," workarounds, and alternate methods of doing things. Finally, our popular "Hall of Fame" department features enlisted members of the MI Corps' Hall of Fame.

We asked the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 311th MI Battalion, to also provide articles for this issue. They developed a series of articles detailing some of the intelligence support provided to an air assault division; several of the articles highlight the roles of their NCOs. These articles present some of the unique techniques that "Screaming Eagle" soldiers use to feed intelligence to combat commanders in a highly mobile, deployable division.

Once again, our January-March issue presents the Roster of Key Intelligence Personnel as a centerfold pullout. Based on feedback from you, the reader, we know that the Roster is a great reference and networking tool for MI personnel throughout the force.

In this issue we also feature a historical article and book reviews on the Vietnam era. There are few Vietnam veterans left in our Army today, but that era has much to teach us about fighting that type of war.

We rely on our readers to send us articles! Topics that may form the themes of future issues include—

☐ MI Deployability.
☐ Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
☐ Force Modernization.
☐ Peacekeeping Operations.
☐ Reevaluation of MI Soldier Training.

We hope that you enjoy reading about the MI NCO in action. A single issue of **MIPB** cannot do justice to the tremendous effort that the MI enlisted force exerts in support of Army intelligence efforts every day.

James W. Niemeier

Writer of the Quarter

MIPB is pleased to announce that Sergeant Major Patricia Ann York is our **Writer of the Quarter** (January-March 1998) for her article, "Career Forecast for the MI Enlisted Force." Congratulations to SGM York and thanks to all of our authors for their great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Contributions like yours make **MIPB** the professional development forum for military intelligence professionals.

How to Submit an Article

1. Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community. Plan to write 2000-3000 words, or roughly 4-6 pages.
2. Write an outline to organize your work. Put the bottom line up front and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs.
3. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult **DA Pamphlet 600-67** or William A. McIntosh's **Guide to Effective Writing**, if necessary.
4. Maintain the active voice as much as possible. Write "Congress cut the budget" rather than "the budget was cut by Congress." (See **DA Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders**, paragraph 3-2b(1).)
5. Please send the article via E-mail to mipb@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or mail it to Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-CLM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. Please include with your article—
   ☐ Pictures, graphics, and crests with adequate descriptions and photographer credits. (We can return photos if so requested.)
   ☐ If you did not E-mail it, send a computer diskette with the article in Microsoft Word 97 (or any previous version of Word), Word Perfect, or ASC II text. Please do not use special document templates, and separate any graphics files from the text on the disk.
   ☐ A release by your local security office stating that your article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public.
   ☐ A short biography with the full names of all authors of the article. The biography should include each author's current duty position, other related assignments, civilian degrees, and advanced military education (CGSC, War College, SAMS, MSSI, SEIP, PGIP). (Tell us if we can print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)
   ☐ A cover letter with work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your wish to have the article published.
6. Remember, content is the most important part of your article. When in doubt, **send us your article**—we can work out the details.

FEATURES

DEPARTMENTS

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:

Joel B. Hudson

JOEL B. HUDSON
Acting Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army

DENNIS J. REIMER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

04402

VANTAGE POINT

USAIC&FH Restructure

by Brigadier General John W. Smith

For many at Fort Huachuca, 1997 will be remembered as the year of the Army Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) in addition to our having trained about 9,000 soldiers. The Intelligence Center participated heavily in both the Brigade Task Force XXI AWE in March at the National Training Center and the division-level AWE in November at Fort Hood, Texas. The AWEs are essentially the Army's "tests" of its actions to upgrade its capabilities to those outlined in Force XXI, and to keep pace with the significant changes in the way we will fight in the 21st century.

While supporting the AWEs last year, the Intelligence Center also acted to keep in step with the pace of change occurring Armywide. Over the course of 1997, the Intelligence Center devised a plan to restructure the MI schoolhouse to better prepare Fort Huachuca to train the Army's MI force in the next century. In this piece, I'd like to update you on the effort to restructure the Intelligence Center, a major undertaking that took all of 1997 to complete.

The Challenge

Simply put, the reality of change brought on by technology, resource cuts, and the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) of MI units led us to examine whether our current structure was up to the task of allowing us to continue putting out a first-rate "product"—students, doctrine, and organizational and materiel solutions. The consensus was that change was in order.

As a consequence, we convened a task force (TF) charged with fulfilling some simple goals:

☐ Take a fresh look at not just **what** "products" we should be providing for Force XXI and beyond, but also look at **how** we do it.

☐ Eliminate layering and consolidate like functions.

☐ Put the necessary resources in the hands of the person responsible for delivering the product.

The TF was charged with examining not only the organizational structure but also the physical and information structures. In the end, the TF was challenged to eliminate redundancy and irrational ways of doing business while positioning the Intelligence Center to deliver first-rate "products" to the MI force on timelines that would answer the needs of digitized intelligence under Force XXI.

The Result

The Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, approved the restructure concept and plan in September. We are in the midst of implementing it now. (*Editor's Note: See page 32 for a diagram of the three new directorates with points of contact in each organization.*)

The scope of change brought on by Fort Huachuca's restructure is enormous, so I will confine my discussion to four areas where we have brought like talent and functions together or pursued some "flattening" of the organization. One of the main ideas that we pursued in the new structure was to separate initial entry training from follow-on career development. That pointed to two separately focused organizations—the 111th MI Brigade and the Continuous Learning Directorate—each led by a colonel and resourced to do its own training development and training. The third area combines concepts and doctrine. Finally, the Directorate of Operations, Training, and Doctrine was integrated into the three new directorates.

111th Military Intelligence Brigade. As noted, the 111th will narrow its focus. It will conduct initial entry training—for enlisted soldiers, but also for warrant officers (the Warrant Officer Basic Course)

and lieutenants (the MI Officer Basic Course). To execute this mission, the brigade will go from a five- to a three-battalion structure, with each battalion focusing on a primary aspect of military intelligence—analysis, signals intelligence, and technical collection. The 304th MI Battalion will be inactivated; its unmanned aerial vehicle, Advanced QUICKFIX, and Guardrail Common Sensor missions will migrate to the technical collection battalion. In keeping with a recent force structure initiative to create Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) composite units in the MI force structure, RC soldiers will be integrated into each battalion as well as the brigade staff.

Continuous Learning Directorate. This new organization will focus on providing advanced skills training; it is thus charged with the responsibility to develop exportable training products for MI units in the field. As the Intelligence Center moves more into distance learning, the lead will belong to this organization. Advanced enlisted, warrant officer, and commissioned officer training will occur here. The officer training battalion (326th), formerly in the 111th MI Brigade, will be resubordinated to the Continuous Learning Directorate. It will develop and conduct both the Warrant Officer Advanced Course and the MI Officer Advanced Course. The Noncommissioned Officer Academy will be aligned with the officer training battalion.

In addition to these training units, the Continuous Learning Directorate will have subelements whose focus is on advanced individual skills and advanced collective skills. The recently developed All-Source Analysis System Master Analyst Program, for example, will be part of the advanced individual skills organization. The advanced collective skills organization will focus on the needs of MI units in the field. It will develop and export common scenarios, lead the Intelligence Center's distance learning development, and develop and export tools (like the Combat Synthetic Training Assessment Range and Military Intelligence Combat Assessment Tables) to facilitate collective training and evaluation by unit commanders. In a nutshell, you may think of Continuous Learning as the single "belly button" to push if you are in the field and need training help.

Futures Directorate. This organization is in part an evolution from the previous Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD). A significant part of the front-end training development function moved to this organization. The intent is to greatly reduce the time and intellectual "distance" between the point where ideas first appear as "concepts" from Integrated Concept Teams and the point in time when they appear as DTLOMS (doctrine, training, leaders, organizations, materiel, and soldiers) products.

Futures will be a home not only to concept writers but also to doctrine writers. We believe that the traditionally long lag between concept and doctrine de-

velopment will be significantly improved as a result of this move.

The Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence (better known as OCMI), will transition from being a stand-alone organization to becoming an element of Futures. The "manning-the-force" function previously directed by OCMI will be consolidated with Master Plans, the former DCD element that did Table of Organization and Equipment design for MI units. OCMI's MI Branch Relations functions, such as its conduct of the annual Hall of Fame ceremony, will move to the Garrison Command as part of the latter's newly created Community and Branch Relations organization.

New systems training, including the New Equipment Training Team, will also be part of the Futures Directorate. As part of the effort to consolidate all systems-related functions, Training and Doctrine Command Systems Managers will also be aligned with Futures. Finally, the Battle Command Battle Lab-Huachuca, the Intelligence Center's leader in experimentation, will be aligned with the Futures Directorate to better facilitate coordination of the Intelligence Center's experimentation activity with initiatives in combat and doctrine development. As in the case of the 111th MI Brigade and the Continuous Learning Directorate, the Futures Directorate will also have RC soldiers integrated throughout its structure.

Directorate of Operations, Training, and Doctrine (DOTD). With the new look of this reorganization, something had to "give." This was it. DOTD was disbanded, with its core functions migrating to other organizations. As I mentioned earlier, the training development function, formerly done only in DOTD, will now be done by both training organizations. Doctrine, as noted, moved to Futures.

Conclusion

Because of space constraints, the above clearly is only an overview of what consumed the better part of 1997 and about 10 man-years of effort. I offer this to keep you abreast of what is going on in **your** branch, but more importantly to communicate this thought: **We are intent on delivering the best, most timely product possible to MI soldiers and commanders.** With this action, we believe that we have postured ourselves to be ahead of the pace of change that technology, resource reductions, and unit OPTEMPOs have put on our collective plates.

If you want to comment on the reengineering or offer further ideas for us to consider, send your "cards and letters" to smithj@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Randolph Hollingsworth

> Machines are machines, but soldiers are people who operate machines; who make machines do all sorts of great things. But unlike soldiers, machines can't think, feel, lead, or follow. Machines are not committed to our profession.
>
> — CSM Gary A. Jones, 111th MI Brigade

Since the birth of our Army more than 220 years ago, there have been thousands of changes that have made it the great organization that it is today. Gone are the muskets, horses, Gatling guns, salt pork, brown coffee cups, tin trays, M-14 rifles, Jeeps, OV-ID Mohawks, and, eventually, grease pencils. No longer does the Army's inventory include the equipment without which we once believed we could not do our jobs. The old hand-powered light table and other high-speed, low-drag equipment are gone. Instead, we now have the All-Source Analysis System, Ground-Based Common Sensor, and unmanned aerial vehicles. On the horizon, as products of Battle Command Battle Lab-Huachuca's efforts, we see emerging technologies that will make our present equipment obsolete.

For almost 30 years, I have seen the doctrine of our Army change based on the intelligence that our soldiers provide to the combat commander. They no longer think of us as a secondary battlefield functional area when they do their intelligence planning—they think of MI first. Properly deploying assets and using intelligence correctly is a major concern for all leaders. They think of their MI soldiers and NCOs as the "early warning system" in all types of operations. Our commanders want to ensure that we get the training we need to fulfill that critical mission.

Soldiers Are Our Credentials

Despite all of the changes that have occurred in our Army, two constants are the soldiers and the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who lead, train, and care for them. The same caliber of professionals who fought with George Washington, Robert E. Lee, George Patton, and Douglas MacArthur are serving the United States and the world today. Soldiers from the rank of private through command sergeant major still support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America every day by obeying the orders of the officers who lead them.

From Hawaii to Maine and from Alaska to Florida, our young men and women have come together and formed a truly first-class Army in the world. During the darkest of days and darkest of nights, they have made the difference between success and failure in war, peace, and humanitarian efforts that span the

U.S. Army photo

globe. Women and men of different ethnicities and religious beliefs are America's "credentials." They provide the staying power that remains while systems and organizations come and go.

As the senior enlisted soldier in the MI Corps, I know there would not be an MI Corps sergeant major without great soldiers and noncommissioned officers in our ranks. It is not me who makes our Corps great—it is our soldiers and NCOs.

Thanks to Our NCOs

As Brigadier General Charles Canham (September 1944) said, "our soldiers are our credentials." Without great soldiers, MI would not be the combat multiplier that it is today. This issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* is dedicated to all MI soldiers and NCOs who keep our Corps "Always Out Front!" We dedicate this issue to the—

☐ Soldiers who served with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton (our MI hero) during the Revolutionary War.

☐ Soldiers who turned defeat into victory in World War II.

☐ First soldier to fall in Vietnam.

☐ Soldiers who went to Panama.

☐ Soldiers who lost their lives in Southwest Asia.

☐ MI soldiers who are pulling guard duty right now in some remote spots in Europe and the NCOs that must care for them.

☐ Soldiers in Bosnia, Haiti, Korea, Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, Fort Belvoir, and other locations around the world where there is a need to know and find the enemy.

This issue of *MIPB* is for all soldiers, young or old, who wear MI brass. For those who analyze, intercept, cue, interrogate, translate, and perform other intelligence functions, this is our way of saying "Thank you."

On behalf of Major General Thomas, our Corps Commander, I want to personally thank every MI soldier for believing that excellence is not just a word, but, rather, our way of life. I also want to thank every NCO for training our soldiers to the highest standard, for leading them through tough times, and for keeping faith in our leadership.

Don't forget that "Always Out Front" starts with soldiers. The 21st century belongs to all of us in Military Intelligence: soldiers, NCOs, commissioned officers, and civilians.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

LETTERS

To The Editor:

Major David G. Puppolo's article, "Caution: Most Likely Enemy COA May Become Least Likely," in the July-September 1997 issue of *MIPB* hits the mark and is an obvious S2 shortcoming at the National Training Center (NTC). However, the bottom line is that the majority of S2s simply do not understand that the tactics and techniques of the opposing force (OPFOR) enable them to present multiple enemy courses of action (ECOAs). During the wargame, this leads to failure to present all enemy options and fight the OPFOR as he will fight on the battlefield. Secondly, too often S2s fail to modify ECOAs based on the current enemy reconnaissance situation. Both failings lead to S3s and commanders "fighting the plan," not the enemy. If the S2 is to stay focused on fighting the enemy, he must know how the OPFOR uses reconnaissance and deception based on "Blue" forces (BLUFOR) dispositions.

The OPFOR executes deception by reaffirming the BLUFOR S2's most likely template during the reconnaissance and main battle fight. During offensive operations, the OPFOR reconnaissance confirms or denies the BLUFOR dispositions and determines what the BLUFOR thinks

is the most likely ECOA. **The OPFOR fights its enemy, not the plan.**

During mission analysis, the task force S2 is usually given two to three hours to develop multiple ECOAs. These are finished prior to the completion of the BLUFOR plan, the counterreconnaissance battle, and 12 to 18 hours prior to the main battle fight. It is important to note that these COAs are a general idea of OPFOR options. During this stage of the planning process, there simply is not enough information to portray an adequate representation of the OPFOR. During the wargame, the OPFOR COAs are more thoroughly developed based on reactions to BLUFOR dispositions. The COAs are further refined after enemy reconnaissance activity is developed and current intelligence is added to the template.

Major Puppolo does not address why S2s are failing the most important part of the planning process. I believe this is a professional development issue that can only be alleviated by studying all relevant material addressing the OPFOR. S2s must take it upon themselves to read Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) issues addressing the NTC; *Red Thrust Star* magazine; historical OPFOR

trends; OPFOR TTP (tactics, techniques, and procedures); and other documents and publications. It is the responsibility of brigade S2s and division G2s to establish officer professional development programs and intelligence exercises, and to provide funding for the right-seat and observer/controller ride-along programs that truly prepare S2s for the NTC.

We must never forget that it is our responsibility as MI professionals to ensure our soldiers perform well at all the combat training centers. It is the S2's responsibility to ensure the commander knows and understands all enemy offensive and defensive options. If he fails to do this, he not only has failed in his job but he also will have sacrificed soldiers' lives in combat.

Captain Tom J. Meyer

Fort Knox, Kentucky

To the Editor:

It is a pleasure to respond to First Lieutenant Zeytoonian's suggestion in the April-June 1997 issue of *MIPB*. Comments from the field like these make the task of designing and equipping units easier.

The Role of the NCO in Military Intelligence

by Lieutenant General
Claudia J. Kennedy

Today's noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are the backbone of the MI Corps, just as they are the backbone of America's Army. The Army and MI have traditionally been at their best when our NCO Corps has been at its best—in training, leading, coaching, instilling and enforcing Army values, mentoring, and setting the example for soldiers in peacetime and in combat. Our Army has resolved, despite downsizing and restructuring, never to repeat the mistakes of the past, when we undervalued the essential importance of the NCO.

Vision for the MI NCO

With these fundamental, enduring truths as a foundation, I would like to share my vision for the Army MI NCO of the future, and the challenges that we will all face in making that vision a reality. The Army MI NCO of the future must possess a variety of technical and human skills unmatched in the history of our Army. The scope and complexity of NCO responsibilities are astounding as our goal of truly seamless intelligence becomes a reality. With our national-tactical partnerships becoming more important to each intelligence discipline, our NCOs will have to understand a vastly more demanding array of systems, procedures, and skills than ever before. The reality of the future is that multiple national, operational, and tactical intelligence collection, processing, analysis, reporting, dissemination, and display capabilities will be knitted together to provide focused intelligence support to Army ground commanders forward.

The time when we could afford a stratified Army MI force split between support to national policymakers and support to tactical commanders is over. Strategic, operational, and tactical support must be woven together seamlessly. Our NCOs will be required to balance the competing demands of providing intelligence on a daily basis to the Army, the Department of Defense, and national-level decisionmakers, with those of supporting tactical forces engaged in contingency operations. This will require personal and professional versatility, as we must demonstrate the ability to understand and satisfy intelligence needs with widely divergent requirements for resolution and timelines. MI NCOs will be critical in this process as they first train their soldiers and then manage intelligence operations.

Our NCOs are faced with the challenges of—

☐ Knowing systems capabilities and tasking procedures.

☐ Understanding the soldier skills needed to operate those systems.

☐ Conducting operations in a seamless, virtual environment.

They have to do all this while never forgetting the human dimension. To accomplish the broader goals of the Intelligence XXI vision, we must take care of all of our people—soldiers and civilians.

Challenges We Face

The challenges are clear. More than ever before, the MI force must be ready every single day to conduct the business of intelligence. Taking care of people demands that our NCOs fight to ensure their soldiers' daily involvement in the business of intelligence during peacetime so that they will be prepared for any contingency. Gone are the times when NCO's could "peak" their soldier's technical skills when crisis was imminent.

Today, and in the future, crisis and conflict will develop at an amazingly fast pace. Our intelligence force will respond with early deployments to multiple locations to leverage national systems' capabilities and to provide focused support forward. Our NCOs are training a force which will be operationally split among multiple locations. If our NCOs do not train the required soldier skills on a daily basis in a collocated garrison environment, our doctrinal split-based operations have no chance to succeed. The ability to respond immediately, coupled with the exacting demands of our force protection mission, require that we be ready. If our NCOs are not ready, our solders will not be ready, and we will be unable to provide the support our Army requires and deserves.

Fundamental Values

As we move into this increasingly complex and fast-paced environment, the basic fundamental values of our profession become increasingly important:

☐ Duty.
☐ Honor.
☐ Courage.
☐ Loyalty.
☐ Integrity.
☐ Respect.
☐ Selfless service.

These values form the cornerstone of what makes our Army the best in the world. From them follow trust,

Career Forecast for the MI Enlisted Force

FOREWORD

Donald R. Torrence, Jr., Army DCSINT Sergeant Major

Change seems to be a recurring theme throughout the evolution of the United States Army. For example, advances in technology are constantly providing new opportunities for increased efficiency and productivity. Since all aspects of military intelligence rely on the exploitation and incorporation of the latest technological advances, MI may seem to experience the most change of any branch in the Army in its capabilities and missions.

Though perpetual change may be a bit challenging, we must keep the perspective that this is positive growth and necessary progress. The technological advances that allow us to "work smarter, not harder" relieve the growing pains incurred by "doing more with less."

With the dissolution of the Soviet threat, and the subsequent force drawdown, the Army is also undergoing changes to the structure of its most precious resource, its people. Just as technological advances are allowing us to change the way in which we perform our intelligence missions, the changes to the personnel structure of military intelligence are helping us to slim and trim the MI force to make it leaner and more efficient.

The most recent changes to the MI force structure are the Change in NCO Structure (CINCOS) and the personnel reductions recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Both programs have given MI the opportunity to reconfigure unit authorization documents and the structure of the NCO Corps to serve the mission of intelligence units and the careers of individual soldiers better.

However, the current changes are different from the reductions and restructuring that have occurred in the past. For the first time, they are affecting a volunteer force—a force of soldiers who chose to serve in the Army instead of a force comprised of draftees. Fortunately, the changes still provide room for the professional growth of all MI soldiers.

Sergeant Major York's article below describes these changes in the MI enlisted force structure. As you read this piece, keep in mind that these changes are good for MI and good for the individual soldier. If soldiers truly are our "credentials," then we are helping to provide our "credentials" with brighter futures and better careers.

Sergeant Major Don Torrence is currently the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) SGM. He has extensive experience in intelligence and special forces operations, which includes serving as the G2 Sergeant Major for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and as the Detachment Sergeant for 2d Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group. He holds a bachelor of science degree in Management and Technology from the University of Maryland and has nearly completed a master of science degree in Security Management from Webster University. Readers can contact him telephonically at (703) 695-0316, DSN 225-0316, or via E-mail at donald.torrence@hqda.army.mil.

**by Sergeant Major
Patricia Ann York**

We are an Army in the midst of change. Missions, technology, and doctrine are all changing. When the threat was perceived as large, the defense budget was comparable. Now, increasingly limited resources form just one of the many challenges we face as we move toward the next century. The current world political climate assures us that it will be years before another superpower achieves parity with the United States. Yet, while we address a variety of new missions, we must always be prepared to wage a full-scale war at any time.

Military intelligence is changing to meet these challenges. We recently implemented changes to the MI enlisted force structure. These changes were more in response to events of the past than in anticipation of future events. (See the discussion of the Change in the NCO Structure in the Proponent Notes section, page 56, in

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However, the current changes are different from the reductions and restructuring that have occurred in the past. For the first time, they are affecting a volunteer force—a force of soldiers who chose to serve in the Army instead of a force comprised of draftees. Fortunately, the changes still provide room for the professional growth of all MI soldiers.

Sergeant Major York's article below describes these changes in the MI enlisted force structure. As you read this piece, keep in mind that these changes are good for MI and good for the individual soldier. If soldiers truly are our "credentials," then we are helping to provide our "credentials" with brighter futures and better careers.

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by Sergeant Major Patricia Ann York

We are an Army in the midst of change. Missions, technology, and doctrine are all changing. When the threat was perceived as large, the defense budget was comparable. Now, increasingly limited resources form just one of the many challenges we face as we move toward the next century. The current world political climate assures us that it will be years before another superpower achieves parity with the United States. Yet, while we address a variety of new missions, we must always be prepared to wage a full-scale war at any time.

Military intelligence is changing to meet these challenges. We recently implemented changes to the MI enlisted force structure. These changes were more in response to events of the past than in anticipation of future events. (See the discussion of the Change in the NCO Structure in the Proponent Notes section, page 56, in

the October-December 1997 issue of *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*.)

As the results of the Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) are evaluated, we may need to make additional enlisted force structure changes. It may be premature to articulate those changes, but current events and technology already foreshadow some inevitable changes in the structure of the MI enlisted military occupational specialties (MOSs) and Career Management Fields (CMFs).

The MI Proponent office must ensure that the impact of these changes on soldiers is fully addressed. This article is a subjective assessment of the current status and probable future of our enlisted force. The Army averages are used as a reference point for assessing the health of promotions, accessions, and retention.

General Changes in the Enlisted Force Structure

Five years ago, there were 18 MI enlisted MOSs, excluding the four "capper" (Z) MOSs. Effective 1 October 1998, we will have only 13 MOSs: 7 in collection and 6 in analysis. As technology advances, we will need fewer soldiers to collect intelligence and more soldiers involved in the analysis and processing of intelligence. However, the requirement for collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence will not change.

As technology advances, we will need fewer soldiers to collect intelligence and more soldiers involved in the analysis and processing of intelligence

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Previous "lessons learned" demonstrated the need to improve our ability to rapidly assimilate the enormous volume of information our systems are capable of acquiring. As we restructure our force, we will base CMF alignment on function—maintainers, collectors, processors, and analysts—rather than on the current CMF divisions that are based on the types or disciplines of intelligence. This will require a total force review to eliminate redundancies and focus our very limited human resources on those critical intelligence functions which cannot be replaced by advances in technology.

Using a cradle-to-grave training approach, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) is reviewing training strategies for all of the enlisted MOSs to ensure that they are relevant to current and future mission requirements.[1] This training approach covers—

☐ Advanced individual training (AIT).

☐ The MI Basic and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Courses.

☐ Functional training courses.

There will be a reduction in post-AIT training that requires soldiers to leave their home stations to learn new skills. Instead, more training will be provided via distance-learning protocols, saving both time and money. A by-product of reduced budgets and enhanced technology, distance learning will be an integral part of any future training strategy. The result will be greater emphasis on unit-level technical training and certification, which will allow units to adapt training to meet their unique mission requirements.

MOS-Specific Changes and Promotion Prospects

Promotions for those MOSs which were over-structured prior to CINCOS will continue to be slow for the next two to three years. For most MOSs, promotion prospects to sergeant (SGT) will continue to be good. Promotions to staff sergeant (SSG), sergeant first class (SFC), and master sergeant (MSG) will improve beginning in fiscal year (FY) 00 with all MOSs reaching parity with the rest of the Army by FY 01. The speed at which each MOS returns to healthy promotion levels will depend in part on the number of soldiers who participate in the early retirement program and on the number and severity of future force reductions.

CMF 33, Electronic Warfare/Intercept (EW/I) Systems Maintenance. Authorizations for this CMF have decreased significantly over the past few years. They decreased almost 20 percent during the last year alone. Historically, there has been some difficulty retaining soldiers in this CMF. Although senior NCO promotions will slow down along with the rest of MI, junior NCO promotions should continue to be good. The pace of change in this CMF will increase as we improve the way we do business in MI.

The consolidation of CMF 33 into one MOS, effective 1 October 1998, will require soldiers to be proficient in the repair of more EW equipment and systems. Soldiers will also have greater assignment diversity—tactical, strategic, and

MI aviation units. The emphasis on computer technology will increase while the focus on component-level systems repair will decline. Soldiers will do more troubleshooting of network problems on systems linked together on one or more intranets. More training will be conducted via the Internet or exported on compact disc. Training is already being improved to include instruction on the repair of cutting-edge technologies, such as fiber optics.

CMF 96, Military Intelligence. MOSs within this CMF are relatively healthy. Some may require minor repair or redesign. However, we do not expect any significant changes in this CMF until after a complete review of the MI force structure.

MOS 96B, Intelligence Analyst, is the largest MOS in the MI Corps. A key objective of the Proponent office is to focus this MOS on analysis and away from installation security-type functions. It will decrease slightly in authorizations over the next three years. The MOS has remained below authorized strength for the last several years due to a steady increase in authorizations. Out-year accessions, retention, and promotions are expected to be good. If authorizations remain steady, we should be able to meet field requirements by FY 00. The success of the MOS hinges, in part, on the use of automated intelli-

gence tools such as the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) to assist in intelligence processing, analysis, and dissemination.

MOS 96D, Imagery Analyst, is expected to decrease slightly in authorizations over the next three years. The MOS is presently below authorized strength. This personnel operating deficit is due to training limitations, a high initial entry training (IET) attrition rate, and an unprogrammed increase in field requirements. The 96D MOS should be at required operating strength by FY 00. Senior NCO promotion prospects, especially to SFC, are expected to improve over the next three years.

MOS 96H, Imagery Ground Station Operator, is projected to increase in authorizations by almost 50 percent once the Common Ground Station (CGS) is fully fielded. With the recently installed training systems, USAIC&FH should be able to train sufficient numbers of soldiers to meet the requirements. Promotion and assignment opportunities for MOS 96H should be good. Soldiers required to reclassify into another

MOS might consider MOS 96H a viable option.

MOS 96R, Ground Surveillance Systems Operator, is expected to decrease in authorizations over the next few years. It is currently below the authorized strength, primarily because of shortfalls in retention. The initial term of service for MOS 96R was recently increased from three to four years and a selective reenlistment bonus was enacted for first-term soldiers. We project the MOS to be at authorized strength by the end of FY 98. The future size of MOS 96R may depend in part on the success of the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The Improved-Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (I-REMBASS), currently operated by the 96R in the light forces, will remain in the future force regardless of the success of the UAV program.

MOS 96U, UAV Operator, will likely be above the authorized strength by FY 98. The cancellation of the Hunter UAV program significantly limited the anticipated growth of this MOS. A replace-

ment Tactical UAV (Outrider) is in the design phase. When the replacement system is fielded, this should be a growth MOS. Meanwhile, MOS 96U has very limited assignment and promotion opportunities. The MI Proponent office is currently reviewing issues affecting the health of this MOS.

MOS 97B, Counterintelligence (CI) Agent, decreased significantly in authorizations in FY 97. The deactivation of two tactical exploitation (TE) battalions (14th MI

Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington, and 163d MI Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas), resulted in a 22 percent decrease in authorizations. This decrease in authorizations and excellent recruiting efforts will result in the MOS reaching its authorized strength in FY 98.

The future size of MOS 96R may depend in part on the success of the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

The CI-human intelligence (HUMINT) Integrated Concept Team (ICT), and a subsequent Council of Colonels conducted in early 1997, recommended the merger of this MOS with MOS 97E, Interrogator. We do not expect this recommendation to move forward until after the completion of an analysis of the AWEs and future CI requirements.

This ongoing proposal may also affect the DCSINT language review discussed later in this article. MOS 97B has a significant number of positions requiring language skills, which will be addressed as part of the DCSINT language review. SSG and SFC promotions will be slow for the next two years. However, significant opportunities still exist for entry into the warrant officer program.

MOS 97E, Interrogator, was also heavily impacted by the deac-tivation of the two TE battalions, resulting in a 14 percent reduction. Like MOS 97B, this MOS will reach authorized strength in FY 98. The DCSINT language review may have a significant impact on the future structure of this MOS, as well. As technology improves, interactive training devices will enhance USAIC&FH's ability to train basic interrogation skills in the target languages. The outlook for senior NCO promotions will improve by FY 00.

CMF 98, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)/Electronic Warfare Operations. We expect significant changes in the structure of this CMF over the next 5 to 10 years. The recent SIGINT Integrated Concept Team proposed realignment of several functions within the CMF. Some of the changes will revolve around the ongoing language initiatives which may result in a complete redesign of MOS 98G.

MOS 98C, SIGINT Analyst, will decrease slightly in authorizations over the next three years. Despite historical recruiting problems, the strength of the MOS is relatively healthy. It should be at authorized strength by FY 99. Some shortages exist for positions which require a foreign language. These positions will be addressed as part of the DCSINT language review. Analytical tools such as the ASAS system will become increasingly more important to this MOS. MOS 98C will continue to play a significant role at all echelons of the force. Promotion opportunities will improve by FY 00.

Significant opportunities still exist for entry into the warrant officer program

MOS 98G, Voice Interceptor, the largest MOS in the CMF and second largest in MI, is projected to decrease in authorizations over the next three years. The MOS is consistently below authorized strength for some languages. By FY 99, it is projected to be at or near authorized strength with interceptors in some languages, such as Korean, continuing to be a critical shortage. Historically, this MOS has had problems with accessions and retention. Most of the problems associated with MOS 98G will be addressed as part of the DCSINT language review. The use of interactive training devices and live training opportunities will increase for MOS 98G.

MOS 98H, Communications Locator/Interceptor, authorizations have declined significantly over the past few years. The reason for the decline is twofold—a decrease in mission requirements and an increase in technological capabilities which require fewer human resources. In the future, the focus of this MOS will expand to include a broader spectrum of communications modes. Retention is still good for this MOS. Promotions through the grade of SFC will be healthy by FY 00. MSG promotions may be sluggish for an additional year.

MOS 98J, Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/Analyst, will decrease slightly in authorizations over the next three years. By the end of FY 98, the MOS is projected to be at authorized strength. Functions associated with this MOS are likely to be realigned with MOS 98H and 98K over the next 5 to 10 years. Senior NCO promotions are expected to show improvement by FY 99.

MOS 98K, **Signals Collection/Identification Analyst**, is a relatively small MOS which is under consideration for realignment. This could very well become the information operations (IO) MOS of the future. As the role and functions associated with this MOS evolve, we can expect this to become a growth MOS. Both recruiting and retention are good.

Language

On 14 August 1997, the DCSINT reported the Army's Foreign Language posture to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA). The report was based on a six-month comprehensive assessment which focused on—

☐ Total Army language requirements.

☐ Training and readiness.

☐ Recruiting and retention.

☐ Linguist force structure and management.

The VCSA approved the issues identified in the briefing and assigned specific lead responsibilities for follow-on actions which collectively will enhance the Army's future language posture. The DCSINT will make periodic reports to the VCSA on the progress of these actions. In December 1997, the VCSA approved the creation of an Army Language General Officer Steering Committee to work in concert with the DCSINT Army Language Committee and the Army commands and staffs.

The briefing to the VCSA has focused senior Army leadership on systemic language problems. The Army is reexamining its language posture and is attempting to fix those problems so we may have a healthy language force as we transition to Force XXI. USAIC&FH has a leading role in resolving several of the issues identified by

the DCSINT. We are evaluating the following issues:

☐ Preventing erosion of language skills during AIT.

☐ Developing the linguist career maps.

☐ Determining the feasibility of creating a linguist MOS.

☐ Creating consolidated Active Component MI linguist units.

The MI Proponent office is designing career maps that will link specific language proficiencies to the NCO Education System. This new career design for linguists relies on the necessary training tools to support linguists reaching the higher proficiency levels. Structuring and managing linguist MOSs by language is also under consideration. This will place the MOS management emphasis on the most critical and perishable part of the MOS. Also, the DCSINT is working toward placing linguist NCOs with the U.S. Army Recruiting Command to assist in the recruitment of soldiers with civilian-acquired foreign language skills.

No matter which direction this effort to re-tool the MI linguist force takes, it is certain that technology will have a long-term impact on our need for language skills. Technology will not replace our need for linguists but we do expect it to enhance our ability to provide rapid translations. Technology will also impact on our ability to maintain these skills.

> ## NCOs at all levels must be prepared to take on expanded leadership functions and technical roles as we grow smaller

Conclusion

As we reshape our force, NCOs must also reshape their thinking as well. Previously, terms such as computer "nerd," "geek," and "techno-geek" identified soldiers who spent enormous amounts of time working on computers. If the preliminary indications from the

AWEs are accurate, operating in an automated environment must become second nature to all MI soldiers and leaders. This does not mean that we will throw out the core leadership competencies that are the cornerstone of the NCO Corps. On the contrary, they will become even more important.

NCOs at all levels must be prepared to take on expanded leadership functions and technical roles as we grow smaller and more technologically based. We must not only be tactically proficient, but we must also remain technically proficient. NCOs at all levels must be prepared for greater involvement in mission planning and assessment, as well. Senior collectors must be more involved with collection pianning and senior analysts must be more involved with mission planning and predictive analysis. The preparation for tomorrow must begin today.

The Roles of MI NCOs in the 75th Ranger Regiment

by Sergeant First Class
James A. Blaess

Providing **tactical** intelligence to the combat commander should be the goal of military intelligence units and organizations at both the tactical and strategic levels. The MI noncommissioned officer (NCO) can accomplish this goal through technical and tactical proficiency, understanding the needs of the user, accessing the right information from the best possible sources, and disseminating that information as quickly and as accurately as possible. This article discusses how the MI NCOs and intelligence soldiers of the 75th Ranger Regiment accomplish the mission of providing tactical intelligence to the combat commander.

Intelligence NCOs' Mission and Organization

At the 75th Ranger Regiment, our mission is to plan and conduct special military operations in support of U.S. policy and objectives. The 75th Ranger Regiment's intelligence section is an integral element in determining the regiment's success. Our mission is to provide timely, quality intelligence support to the regimental commander, staff, and ranger battalions during the conduct of all Ranger operations, while maintaining an 18-hour worldwide deployment capability.

The Rangers' unique mission and capabilities require the section to function with efficiency and tactical and technical proficiency without hesitation. The 32 intelligence NCOs and intelligence specialists assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment and its three battalions play an essential role in this mission.

To fully understand the Ranger intelligence NCOs' roles in the accomplishment of our mission, it helps to understand the organizational structure. The 75th Ranger Regiment consists of the Regimental Headquarters and 3d Battalion collocated at Fort Benning, Georgia; 2d Battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington; and 1st Battalion located at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia. To best support three separated battalions, the majority of the intelligence personnel are at the headquarters with the Regiment's S2 and MI Detachment (MID). The MID consists of the analysis, communications, counterintelligence, and weather sections. The regimental S2 maintains oversight of both the Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment (RRD) and the MID.

Phased Support for the MID

The MID supports Ranger operations in three distinct phases: pre-deployment, deployment, and employment. The functions of the detachment NCOs during these phases are addressed below.

Pre-deployment Phase. The most important task of our NCOs during this phase is ensuring the detachment's ability to deploy, with all available personnel, anywhere in the world within 18 hours of notification. This requires constant supervision to ensure that everyone is deployable, has personal matters in order, is weapons-qualified, and that all equipment is always ready and packed. It is the Ranger view that "you must first get to the war, before you can fight it." While accomplishing this task, the NCOs must also complete the equally important mission of providing intelligence support to the tactical military decisionmaking process (MDMP) that occurs in conjunction with every Ranger deployment. Other day-to-day functions during this phase include developing the following products:

☐ The Daily Read File, which provides current intelligence to the commander, selected staff members, and the battalions. It provides information to the analysis section on the intelligence interests of our higher headquarters and gives the analysts a basis on which to focus intelligence gathering. This product also exercises the intelligence systems with which we deploy.

☐ The Country Workbook, which forms the core of the information the analyst will use in a deployment or crisis situation. It is designed as a ready reference so that the analyst will have access to information on a specific country if the need arises.

☐ The Order of Battle Workbook, which is developed each time a situation or crisis occurs that leads the regiment to begin mission analysis and troop-leading procedures for possible Ranger involvement.

☐ The Weekly Bluebook, which is the primary method used by the detachment to communicate current intelligence to the commander, staff, and non-deployed battalions.

☐ The Weekly Intelligence Brief, which is the method used by the regional analysts to communicate current intelligence to the rest of the section. The dialog offers the MID Senior Intelligence Sergeant the opportunity to provide feedback and guidance, allows the analyst to practice briefing techniques, and becomes an open forum of discussion for assessments.

☐ The "Top Ten" Hot Country List, which provides a focus for potential hot spots to the

commander, staff, and battalions, and informs our higher headquarters of our focus. It also provides the analysts with a basis of information to focus our intelligence gathering effort better.

Deployment Phase. During this phase, the MID coordinates the intelligence-gathering effort and produces its intelligence products in preparation for combat operations. The focus for the Ranger MI NCO during this phase is on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

The detachment has very specific standing operating procedures (SOPs) that are employed during this process. The primary one is the Regimental Intelligence SOP, which draws heavily on low-intensity stability and support operations and special operations doctrine. It is the responsibility of the MID NCOs to produce the products and to supervise the IPB process. The Ranger intelligence NCOs are directly responsible for coordinating the activities of the analysis and collection management sections of the MID.

The Analysis Section conducts the initial IPB. It focuses on target-specific areas, using the intelligence processes of battlefield area evaluation, terrain and weather analysis, threat evaluation, and threat integration. The section uses **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**, as a guideline, but it specifically tailors its analysis to Ranger operations. The Analysis Section produces paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the intelligence estimate[1] and provides all available intelligence to selected ranger battalions and RRDs in the most timely and efficient manner possible.

The Collection Management Section locates all available imagery products and maps, and establishes a dissemination plan. They compile a list of all needed and available imagery and map resources and analyze imagery in support of the IPB process.

Employment Phase. During this third phase, the MID provides the necessary and available intelligence to the commander, staff, and subordinate Ranger battalions and to the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF). They perform the four critical tasks described below.

While conducting Regimental main command post (R-MAIN) operations, the intelligence NCOs assist in orchestrating the intelligence effort as directed by the regimental commander. They must interface with the staff, battlefield functional area (BFA) representatives, subordinate Ranger battalions, units, and attached elements to ensure proper information flow and coordination. Several products used in support of this task are the primary responsibility of the intelligence NCOs working in the R-MAIN and include the following:

☐ A situation map (SITMAP) showing the locations of enemy dispositions and friendly intelligence collection assets.

☐ A significant events list.

☐ Current weather and light data.

☐ Status of intelligence assets.

☐ Enemy battle damage assessment.

☐ Priority target list.

☐ Reconnaissance and surveillance communications schedules.

The second major task is liaison and support to command and control (C^2) operations. Other NCOs provide Intelligence BFA representation to C^2 nodes or liaison teams as dictated by the mission. The MID has sent NCOs on the C^2 teams supporting every conflict since the activation of the regimental headquarters.

Intelligence production, the next critical task, is conducted by the Analysis Section during employment. The focus of this element is monitoring the current battle, while preparing for the future battle. The Analysis Section is re-

sponsible for conducting the following actions:

☐ Processing incoming message traffic.

☐ Updating the SITMAP with current enemy information, light and weather data, enemy order of battle, and friendly forces disposition.

☐ Preparing overlays.

☐ Conducting terrain analysis and target research.

☐ Preparing target folders for dissemination to subordinate Ranger battalions and the RRD.

☐ Preparing for briefings.

☐ Producing intelligence summaries and Annexes B to the Operations Orders for follow-on missions.

The Air Force Weather Section assists by providing accurate weather intelligence and forecasts for current operations as well as future operations.

The fourth task is collection management. Some of the responsibilities of these intelligence NCOs include ensuring the message flow is handled according to our SOP and submitting requests for support and requests for intelligence information to higher headquarters and echelons. In addition, they maintain the intelligence journal, Requests for Information (RFIs) log, collection plan, and collection asset status board. Finally, they maintain an accurate inventory of all on-hand imagery and photographs, analyze imagery in support of the target development process, produce sketches of specific areas of importance, and also order, maintain, and distribute maps to mission planners.

Conclusion

To provide the combat commander with the greatest opportunity for success, we must ensure that our subordinates are prepared to deploy at very short notice, understand our SOPs, and

NCO Team Leaders:
Building and Showing Confidence

by Sergeant Sammy Villela

It is still dark as the three soldiers walk up to the infantry brigade headquarters armed with PVS-7 night vision goggles, M16A2 rifles, and 9-millimeter pistols, and wearing complete load-carrying equipment and Kevlar^{TM}. They are not infantrymen, but neither are they strangers to the brigade. As they enter the double doors of the headquarters, a slim, leather-faced sergeant first class with a 101st combat patch halts them at the door and asks to see their ID cards. After the standard security procedure, they are on their way down the hall to the brigade S2's office. As they enter the busy office, a young captain turns and faces the team, smiles, and extends an open hand to the familiar team leader—familiar, too, because of the rapport built through constant liaison and coordination visits both in the field and in garrison. Familiar too because of the many exercises, deployments, and Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises they have endured together. Familiar, also, because this team is the DRF 1 team of the MI Company.

What? An MI company with a division ready force (DRF) 1 team? Yes, that is correct! It is a team of two counterintelligence agents and one interrogator.

However, this is not the only team that the MI company provides for the DRF. The DRF 2 and 3 teams from the MI company include:

- Ground surveillance systems (GSS) teams.
- Low-level voice intercept (LLVI) teams.
- A transcription and analysis (TA) cell.

- A TLQ-17 TRAFFICJAM team for jamming enemy communications.
- The headquarters element, consisting of a retransmission team, NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) warfare noncommissioned officer, supply element, and team of intelligence analysts to form the Analysis and Control Team (ACT).

Teams, teams everywhere. All of the collection assets listed above, and MI's most visible support to the brigade task force (TF) are small, independently operated, mobile teams. The leaders of these teams range in rank from specialist to sergeant. Thus, one must say that the MI company's successful support of a combat infantry brigade TF depends heavily on the abilities of young, tough, decisive, and capable team leaders with initiative and an unmatched "can do" attitude. To be successful, team leaders must be "confidence builders" and "confidence show-ers."

The Need for "Confidence Builders"

MI NCOs have to build the confidence of their team members. Consider the TLQ-17 team leader, for example. That leader trains his team's soldiers on all aspects of the system, including vehicle and equipment maintenance and battle drills. The team members must be able to step up and successfully perform in the team leader's place, should that team leader be injured or killed.

The CI team leader must coordinate safe passage through another unit's area of operations when his team is on its way to a traffic control post (TCP), or just conducting battlefield circulation. This coordination includes obtain-

ing the call signs and frequencies of those units, so that the CI team members can call for help should they need it.

The LLVI and GSS team leaders must be proficient enough to look at a map, perform their terrain analysis, and choose a site that will allow their teams to be most effective. Then they must plan a route to the site that is both fast and safe.

These team leaders and their teams must be tactically proficient to the point that their battle drills are performed to the same standard, if not a higher standard, than those of an infantry team. They must be able to break contact successfully when ambushed or stumbled upon by enemy forces.

The Need for "Confidence Show-ers"

MI puts young NCO leaders in charge of extremely important, sensitive, and high-visibility collection operations. Therefore, it is imperative that our team leaders be extremely technically and tactically proficient. They are the ones who are "selling" that collection asset. They are the ones who show up at mission-planning and operations order (OPORD) briefs to coordinate the use of their personnel and equipment, most of the time in conjunction with numerous officers and senior NCOs.

This requires that team leaders demand answers from captains and lieutenants to ensure that they can accomplish the mission and maintain the highest possible levels of safety for their soldiers. They must be assertive and smart in making recommendations to the brigade or battalion S2, who will determine their final courses of action on the battlefield.

They must, if nothing else, instill in their S2s a sense of confidence that they can be trusted to conduct operations that could save hundreds of lives and a sense that they are mature, capable, technical experts in their fields. The S2 must be confident that no soldier knows a particular system better than that team leader and that the S2 can rely on the team leader's recommendations. This is why good briefing skills are important for all team leaders to have and to demonstrate. They must have good communication skills to clearly relay issues to their teams and to their S2s.

Developing the Team Leader

Good team leaders are not born—they are made. Senior NCOs and officers in the MI company have a responsibility to develop good team leaders. The first sergeant and the platoon sergeants should ensure that the team leaders are doing the right thing—

☐ Conducting tough, mentally challenging physical training.

☐ Soldiering the way they should.

☐ Paying close attention to detail.

☐ Meeting standards and surpassing them.

☐ Training soldiers the way they are going to fight, as small, three- to five-member teams.

☐ Ensuring that the commander allots enough time for proper execution.

☐ Seeing that the teams build good cohesiveness.

First sergeants should remember that not all good ideas come from sergeants and above; junior members of the team sometimes suggest better alternatives. The more informed the soldiers are, the less likely they are to engage in the speculation and interpretation processes that can cause orders to be misconstrued or rumors to be started.

Command-ers: there is one critical thing that you must understand about these tactically proficient MI soldiers. As the Army continues to draw down, those who remain will have to meet increasingly tougher requirements. This means that, on average, the soldier of the future will be much more educated than soldiers in the past. This general increase in the average soldier's knowledge may lead to more "questioning" of your orders. These soldiers will not want to know simply **what** to do, but they will also want to know **why** they must perform the tasks at hand. "Inquiring minds want to know," and are common among the MI soldiers of today.

Show Off the Team!

Finally, the MI Company should simply show off. You read right—show off! Show the brigade and everyone in the brigade TF the MI company's mettle. Proudly show them those AN/PRD-12 Lightweight Man-Transportable Radio Direction-Finding Systems, radars, and those Improved-Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor Systems during static displays. Explain exactly what they do and how they work. Explain the value and importance of the TA cell. Let the CI/human intelligence team explain to them how traffic control points (TCPs), CI force protection source operations, and population resource control measures can greatly enhance the effectiveness and security of our combat forces.

All of you team leaders show them what you and your teams are made of when it is time to go to work. "Hump those rucks" right alongside the infantry soldiers. Eat with them, joke with them, and fight alongside them. Take

pride in your soldiers and your equipment. When your teams do something good, give credit where credit is due. Commanders, ensure that the brigade and battalion staffs know when your collection teams do something spectacular. Ensure they know who the team leader is and ensure that the leader and the team get the recognition they deserve.

Conclusion

The MI Company is unique, mainly because of the quality of the soldiers it requires and retains. I am proud to have served in a company that challenged and conditioned my mind, body, and soul—a company of "Intelligent Barbarians" with a "can do" attitude. NIGHTHAWKS!

Sergeant Sammy Villela recently served as a counterintelligence agent in B Company, 311th Military Intelligence Battalion, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Since writing the article, he has changed duty locations.

The Role of the G2 Plans NCO in MDMP

by Sergeant First Class
Todd A. Voter and Staff
Sergeant Ralph L. Torsone

The ability of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) to plan for future operations is heavily dependent on the G2 Plans noncommissioned officer's (NCO) actions in support of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). During a mission or exercise, the majority of the division's intelligence staff and assets concentrate on current operations. The G2 Plans section must coordinate with multiple sources to conduct the intelligence preparation of the battlefield that will drive the majority of the MDMP for future operations.

Throughout this process, the G2 Plans NCOs act as a hub, pulling in intelligence and other products, advising the battle staff during wargaming, and driving the development of the intelligence estimate, annexes, tabs, and appendices. In the era of "doing more with less," the Plans NCOs must be able to autonomously conduct their missions with a minimal amount of guidance. In this article, we will describe the actions of the 101st G2 Plans NCOs in support of the MDMP.

The MDMP, as described in **FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations,** is the process the commander and staff use to assist them in assessing the situation and in making decisions.[1] Naturally, each step requires that the G2 Planners accomplish certain stated and implied tasks. While all seven steps of the MDMP are important, the four steps shown in Figure 1 comprise the majority of the G2 Plans NCOs' work.

Mission Analysis

Mission analysis begins with the receipt of the mission from higher headquarters or with situational changes that require action.[2] In the event of a real-world deployment, an intelligence NCO should be aware enough of current events to anticipate most likely deployments and begin preparation well in advance. In the case of scheduled exercises, the G2 Plans NCOs begin laying the groundwork for planning well before it registers on the rest of the planning staff's "radar." For example, while the annual Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) exercise in South Korea occurs in August, maps needed for planning are identified and ordered in March. While this means that you might end up with more map coverage than you need, the time to order maps is well before the time when the staff begins planning. Additionally, the long lead time allows you to identify and correct any map shortages.

Other preparations needed for planning fall under the heading of "standard NCO functions," such as ensuring that all of the basic references and adequate supplies of acetate, pens, and unit symbols are on hand to support the G2 Planners. While the details vary for both real-world deployments and exercises, the references provide a starting point from which to begin early planning.

In order to stay one step ahead, the 101st Airborne Division G2 Plans NCOs work closely with other intelligence personnel in the division. They obtain daily assessments from the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Fusion section to identify any changes to the contingency areas in the 101st's area of responsibility (AOR). They also work with G3 Plans and Exercises personnel to stay current on the division's operations and upcoming events on the division's exercise calendar. In general, the G2 Plans section must coordinate with a number of other staff cells to ensure that all of the intelligence products required during the MDMP cycle are complete and timely. Figure 2 shows the various intelligence

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MDMP STEPS — PRODUCTS

| MDMP STEPS	PRODUCTS
MISSION ANALYSIS →	MAPS, SITUATION TEMPLATE, ORDER OF BATTLE CHARTS, TOPOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS, INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
COA DEVELOPMENT →	EVENT TEMPLATE, COURSE OF ACTION BRIEF, COMBAT RATIOS
COA ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON →	DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE, SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX, COLLECTION PLAN, PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
ORDER PRODUCTION →	REFINE ALL PRODUCTS PRODUCE ANNEX

Figure 1. The G2 Plans NCO's Responsibilities.

products required during the MDMP cycle and specifies which staff cells play a part in each product.

Additional tasks for the G2 Plans NCOs early in the MDMP include the creation of computer briefing slides depicting map coverage of the area, order of battle charts, committed and reinforcing forces, probable enemy courses of action (ECOAs), and other products to support the mission analysis briefing. These must be easily interpreted by the division staff, subordinate units, and the division intelligence community. Plans NCOs must anticipate what intelligence products will contribute to the MDMP. An important example is to coordinate with the division terrain detachment to begin the production of topographic products such as the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), elevation and slope tints, bridge classification overlays, and line-of-sight overlays. Imagery covering likely objective areas should also be ordered through the division ACE.

Once the mission analysis phase begins in earnest, the G2 Plans NCOs gear their actions toward the production of the **intelligence estimate** and the situation template. Both products require extensive coordination with multiple sources—especially the estimate. The Division Terrain Detachment, the Staff Weather Office (SWO), and the ACE are each responsible for large portions of the intelligence estimate. The Plans NCO serves as a coordinator, ensuring, for example, that information from the Terrain Detachment or ACE is taken into consideration when the SWO writes the weather effects portion of the intelligence estimate.

The G2 Plans NCOs conduct quality control on both the form and the substance of the estimate. Frequently, the planner may find that the resources and focus of the estimate's contributors are elsewhere. The G2 Plans NCOs must be prepared to obtain the intelligence needed to write a preliminary draft of the estimate. Once the other intelligence sections have the assets to devote to mission analysis, they will refine and further develop the estimate.

The **situation template** is another product developed during this phase.[3] The situation template, when developed properly, enables the analyst to predict probable COAs based on the current enemy situation, doctrine, weather, and terrain. Situational templating is necessary to build a complete picture of the battlefield and enemy COA.

Thought and research must be invested in this templating since it determines the results of the entire decisionmaking process. The collection management team will use the product to identify gaps in intelligence holdings. Targeting personnel will use the template to identify the possible locations of high-payoff and high-value targets. It provides a baseline for the Fusion Cell of the ACE to build and plan the initial overall picture of the enemy. Later, subordinate units will refine the template for use in their own battlefield development. The situation template must be completed by the NCOs prior to the mission analysis brief. They are used to show the commander what the battlefield situation will look like at a given time. This snapshot will make it easier for him to choose his COA.

The actions described above culminate in the **mission analysis brief**. This briefing ensures that the entire staff starts from a common reference point, and that they have a thorough understanding of the mission and the subsequent planning required.[4]

COA Development

Unfortunately, many intelligence NCO's experience in COA development is limited to posting the enemy situation from an intelligence estimate written by someone else. The 101st Airborne Division G2 Plans NCOs must develop a wide range of skills to assist the Plans staff in enemy COA development and analysis. Tasks that fall primarily on the NCO's shoulders include—

☐ Preparing the event template.

☐ Refining enemy COA sketches and other briefing slides.

☐ Determining force ratios.

☐ Developing target numbers and arrays.

	TOPO/MCOO	IMAGERY	MAP SKETCH	INTEL EST	SITEMP	HPT/HVT	EVENT TEMP	RATIOS	PIR/IR	SYNC MATRIX	DST	COLL PLAN	ANNEX B
G2 PLAN	●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
G3 PLAN						●			●	●	●	●	
BATTLE STAFF*						●			●	●	●		
FUSION				●	●			●	●		●		●
CM&D		●		●							●	●	
TERRAIN DET	●			●									
SWO	●			●									

Key: CM&D Collection Management and Dissemination
DST Decision Support Template
PIR Priority Intelligence Requirements
IR Information Requirements
SYNC Synchronization
TOPO Topographic

(* Excluding the G2 and G3 sections)

Figure 2. Division Intelligence Products Matrix.

A Plans NCO incapable of providing these skills drains assets from the team, causing a shortfall in intelligence support to the MDMP.

During the COA development phase of the MDMP, the battle staff develops multiple friendly COAs.[5] While the heaviest burden does not fall on the intelligence planners, they are integral to the process. Although it is not necessary for the mission analysis briefing, the event template must be completed prior to the start of the COA development phase. This template is used to predict time-related events of the enemy's various possible COAs. While this step of the MDMP is not a wargaming step, the enemy's probable reactions to proposed friendly COAs shape the development of those friendly COAs. Another function of the 101st Airborne Division G2 Plans NCOs at the beginning of this step is to determine force ratios. Those ratios and their consequences are essential information in the next step of the MDMP.

COA Analysis and Comparison

The COAs resulting from event templating are the scenarios that the G2 Plans section uses during wargaming.[6] The Plans NCO's tasks during this process include—

☐ Detailed notetaking.

☐ Shaping the synchronization matrix.

☐ Writing requests for information (RFIs).

☐ Researching enemy capabilities and doctrine.

☐ Generally aiding the Plans Officer with the enemy battlefield development.

Our goal is to get the correct information to the G2 Planner as quickly as possible, preferably before it is needed. While the G2 Plans NCOs need a broad-based knowledge of the enemy and the current situation, they do not have to have every detail memorized. However, they must know where

they can quickly retrieve the information.

G2 Plans NCOs of the 101st Airborne Division have access to numerous resources at all levels to assist them. INTELINK (invaluable to the team) and a close working relationship with a number of elements enable us to provide the battle staff with complete and timely resolution of questions arising from the wargaming process. These elements may include the terrain detachment, ACE, other staff elements (e.g., engineers; nuclear, biological, and chemical personnel; air defense artillery), our sister Services, and subordinate units.

The products resulting from the COA analysis and comparison that require the input of the G2 Plans NCOs include the refining of priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR), and the Intelligence battlefield functional areas synchronization matrix. The G2 Plans section assists G3 Plans to determine the critical events, decision points, and significant factors to build into the decision support template (DST).[7]

Orders Production

Upon receiving the staff's COA decision brief, the commander issues his decision and final guidance, and directs the staff to prepare and issue the order.[8] Traditionally a focus of officers, the development of the intelligence annex in the 101st Airborne Division is driven by the G2 Plans NCOs. Scheduling, turn-in procedures, formatting, and content verification are all functions accomplished primarily by the NCOs.

Actually, the G2 Plans NCOs begin providing the content for the annex during the mission analysis and COA steps of the MDMP. During the COA situational development process, the Plans NCOs assist the ACE with its appendices and collection plan development. Finally, through good information management,

the Plans NCOs assist in the coordination and dissemination of the final product: the intelligence annex. It is important for the G2 Plans NCOs to realize that the annex, as with all the intelligence products developed during the MDMP, is never truly final. Constant refinement of products to address the impact of situational changes on division operations is an ongoing function.

Producing an accurate intelligence annex for a particular operation is the final task in the MDMP cycle for the Plans shop. The annex provides the intelligence elements of the division with their missions. To allow adequate planning time for subordinate units, it is important that the annex be produced in a timely manner. Plans NCOs take part in this process from the very beginning. During mission analysis, Plans NCOs assist in identifying the area of interest and the tactical AOR. By working closely with other intelligence assets and the terrain team, the Plans NCOs build a situational awareness essential for the intelligence annex. The products built throughout the MDMP by the G2 Plans NCOs become the basis for the written intelligence portions of the operations order.

Universal Tenets

There are two tenets that the 101st G2 Plans NCOs apply to all of their actions throughout the MDMP: team building and information management. As the lead agency in the division for processing and using intelligence during planning, the G2 Plans section is in a unique position to ensure that the division's intelligence assets work in a common direction, from a common base, avoiding duplication of effort, while cross-referencing their products. Information management—the gathering of information, evaluating its relevance to the mission, then presenting it in a usable form—is the basis of

every 96B Intelligence Analyst's job, especially in G2 Plans.

To keep the MDMP moving smoothly and to allow the G2 Plans officers to concentrate on their jobs, Plans NCOs must—

☐ Anticipate intelligence needs.

☐ Be proactive in accomplishing tasks.

☐ React to unexpected intelligence requirements as they arise.

☐ Coordinate intelligence production in support of the MDMP.

☐ Integrate the contributions of the various intelligence producers.

Again, the Plans NCOs are the first intelligence staff members to concentrate on a mission. The intelligence products the G2 Planners produce will gain a life-force of their own, impacting future plans and operations.

Conclusion

The 101st Airborne Division's G2 Plans NCOs perform multifaceted functions within the Division Plans section and act as the coordination point for intelligence as it makes its way to the division battle staff. To perform this mission, the G2 Plans NCOs must anticipate needs, be proactive, react to the ongoing processes, coordinate among multiple intelligence sections, and integrate the products into the MDMP. Working in the 101st Airborne Division G2 Plans section is a challenging assignment for any NCO. In the future, as the Army's operations tempo increases and the number of soldiers decreases, these NCOs will have do more, often working outside the scope of just "NCO business."

Endnotes

1. **FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations**, 31 May 1997, 5-1 through 5-54.

2. **FM 101-5**, 5-7, 5-11 through 5-13.
3. **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**, May 1989, 4-54.
4. **FM 101-5**, 5-16.
5. **FM 101-5**, 5-18.
6. **FM 101-5**, 5-26.
7. **FM 34-130**, 5-1.
8. **FM 101-5**, 5-45.

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The ACT Concept:
Intelligence Analysis for the Air Assault Task Force

by Sergeant Valmer Taylor

This article will explain the Analysis and Control Team (ACT) concept as it is resourced and implemented by Alpha Company, 311th Military Intelligence Battalion. I will explain how the ACT concept supports a light infantry (air assault) brigade task force (TF) and, ultimately, the modern air assault division.

The ACT is a relatively new concept in MI. It is an attempt to enable the direct support MI company to better meet the dynamic intelligence needs of the TF commander while concurrently remaining relevant in the more technologically driven battlefield of the 21st century.

Separate Sources and Disciplines

As the acronym implies, the main purpose of the ACT is to empower the company assets to "act" by analyzing the information it receives at the team level and by producing timely and predictive intelligence. The ACT has access to the company's signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT) assets.

The fusion of the company's assets into a workable and viable team that shares information and forms assumptions becomes the foundation for the company's predictive analysis. In theory, providing a greater amount of synchronization among company assets results in an improvement in the company's ability to better provide all-source analysis, thus breaching the single-source mentality that traditionally has prevailed at this level.

When limited to single-source analysis in the past, the company was simply a processor of information. It would collect, track, and pass raw intelligence it received to the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support Element (IEWSE) located in the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). Under this system, each of the disciplines acted independently, concerned only with its particular aspect of the mission.

In a sense, the role of the company was one of service support: to provide each team with food and water, to ensure that they were able to communicate, to ensure that their equipment was mission capable, and, most importantly, to track the teams' locations on the battlefield. Accordingly, the analysis and management of intelligence was the responsibility of the IEWSE at the brigade. The ACT gives the DS MI company an analytical presence within the TOC. While a DS MI Company asset, the ACT essentially "lives" in the brigade TOC.

The ACT concept is an attempt to analyze intelligence at the source—the level at which it is produced—and thus complement the efforts of the brigade S2. It is the responsibility of each discipline to monitor the intelligence information collected by its sec- tion, provide analysis, and then pass on the information to the hub of the ACT, the Analytical Cell. For example, the SIGINT assets (the low-level voice intercept, AN/TLQ-17A TRAFFICJAM, and general support AN/TRQ-32 TEAMMATE) produce tactical reports (TACREPs).

The TACREPs are then sent via a special intelligence net to a transcription and analysis (TA) cell where they are broken down and analyzed. The TACREPs provide written summaries of enemy forces' communications and movements on the battlefield. The ACT is then able to apply the SIGINT intercepts to its doctrinal and situational templates to provide the commander with a better understanding of enemy intentions and a more complete picture of the battlefield.

When considered separately, the SIGINT assets provide an excellent picture of the enemy's intentions. However, if you add the movement indicators provided from MASINT assets, like the Improved-Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System and ground surveillance radars, plus the HUMINT data from interrogations and counterintelligence re-

Designed to fuse intelligence products within the TOC, the ACT allows the DS MI company to become an active player in the intelligence process.

ANALYSIS AND CONTROL TEAM
MI Company (DS) ACT
Analysis & Control Team (ACT) Cluster

APACHE LONGBOW
(MTI and messages via
Integrated Data Modem)

ACT ENCLAVE

Direct Broadcast

CGS(P)

J-STARS
MTI/FTI via SCDL

MESHNET Intercom System
Local Area Network
Wide Area Network Broadcast (BADD)

IEWCS: (i.e., Advanced QUICKFIX and Ground-Based Common Sensor)
via Database-to-Database Interface and Surrogate Data Radio

TROJAN Special Purpose
Integrated Remote Intelligence
Terminal (TROJAN SPIRIT)
(TS II) Antenna

TS II

UAV MPS

Global Broadcast
Service (GBS) Battlefield
Area Data Disseminator
(BADD) Surrogate

75-400 meter

Video and
Telemetry
Data

UAV GDT   UAV GCS

KEY:
|	
CGS (P): Common Ground Station (Prototype)	IEWCS: Intelligence Electronic Warfare Common Sensor
FTI: Fixed Target Indicator	J-STARS: Joint-Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
GCS: Ground Control Station	MPS: Mission Planning Station
GDT: Ground Data Terminal	MTI: Moving Target Indicator
	SCDL: Surveillance and Control Data Link

Figure 1. Analysis and Control Team Connectivity Chart.

ports, you have a more complete, all-source picture and a good foundation for predictive analysis.

Fusion of Intelligence

The ACT fuses each section's intelligence into a broader picture, representing the company's perspective of the battlefield. Moreover, as each of the company's sections share information with the others, the analysis becomes fuller and ends up bridging the gaps in the overall intelligence picture. This picture is passed to the brigade S2 as a written intelligence report (INTREP) every 12 hours. The INTREP is an amalgamation of significant activities that occurred in each section during the last reporting period. By providing written representation of each section's activities, the ACT gives the S2 the ability to cross-reference information. Ultimately, the DS MI company and the ACT—due to their abilities to provide predictive analysis to the TF commander—become well-suited to complement a future operations cell for the brigade S2.

The ACT concept challenges the traditional mission of the DS MI company as simply a processor of information. Instead, the DS MI company is actively involved in analyzing intelligence at its level and, based on the types of information available to it, can provide predictive analysis when appropriate.

Avoiding Information Overload

Today's battlefield is increasingly driven by technology. The collection assets available to a TF commander are numerous and varied. While U.S. military forces enjoy a superior advantage in technology, this advantage also creates unique problems for the TF commander and the S2—mainly information overload.

Technology can produce a glut of information. For the intelligence officer who is responsible for managing this information and trying to make sense of it, the overload can literally become a nightmare. In this instance, the S2 is barraged with information, creating a situation in which a plethora of information is just as bad as a paucity of information. The DS MI company can alleviate this situation by reviewing its raw intelligence and culling that which is not relevant to the TF's mission

or the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

Conclusion

The ACT not only provides the S2 with up-to-date mission-essential intelligence but also collects information and formulates assumptions about the enemy forces and their intentions that will ultimately drive future operations. The ACT allows the DS MI company to become an active player in the intelligence process. It enables all the levels involved, from brigade through company, to cross-reference the intelligence they receive. Moreover, it helps to sharpen the focus of the company by actively involving it in the collection and targeting decisions and, ultimately, in answering the commander's PIR. The ACT allows the Company to become a **proactive** rather than a **passive** conduit of information.

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The Air Assault Division's DISE

by Major Warren P.
Gunderman and First
Lieutenant Brett A. Sciotto

As the only air assault division in the world, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) has unique intelligence needs that pose several challenges to the Intelligence battlefield functional area. Like our sister division, the 82d Airborne Division, the mission of the 101st requires that a Division Ready Brigade be "wheels up" for deployment anywhere in the world within 18 hours.

The 101st is unique in that it normally conducts operations 150 to 300 kilometers beyond the line of contact or forward-line-of-own-troops, requiring theater- and national-level intelligence support as a matter of course. The best way to provide this theater- and national-level intelligence support quickly and effectively to the forward deployed units as well as to the division as a whole is to conduct split-based operations by fielding a deployable intelligence support element (DISE).

DISE Concept and Integration

The concept of split-based intelligence operations is not new. For years, senior intelligence officers have briefed the merits of sending forward a light intelligence support package that is linked to an intelligence support base outside the area of operations. On the night of 27 June 1997, the soldiers of the 311th MI Battalion Analysis and Control Element (ACE) put the theory into practice. For the first time, the 101st "air assaulted" a DISE in support of the Division Ready Brigade. The event also marked the first tactical night air assault of a TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (TROJAN SPIRIT) II (TS II).

Integrating a DISE into the air assault division's doctrine is fundamentally challenging. The DISE does not take the place of the assault command post—it augments the assault command post (ACP). The DISE must maximize its capability and mobility, minimize both its weight and signature, and, most essential, get the necessary intelligence to the combat commander. The concept is simple in principle, but it never ceases to challenge the imagination of the DISE leadership.

The mission drives the packaging of the DISE. The centerpiece of the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) DISE is the TS II, around which the DISE is configured. Typically, the 101st DISE will include eight soldiers, a TS II, an All-Source Analysis System-Remote Workstation (ASAS-RWS), and a Warlord Notebook (WLNB) computer, which can all deploy on a total of three vehicles and two trailers. The typical 101st DISE can be lifted by two CH-47 Chinook helicopters and one UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, and can set up almost anywhere in less than two hours.

Mission Architecture

The mission of the DISE is to provide immediate, on-site intelligence fusion and analysis, and to get that intelligence to the combat commanders when they need it. Critical to mission accomplishment is the establishment of an intelligence and communications architecture which brings connectivity to the battlefield. The DISE must have connectivity not only to the ACE back in sanctuary but also to national-level intelligence agencies, corps, and division assets, and, ultimately, to the combat commanders in the field.

The TS II provides access to the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). It also provides communications and datalinks to the ACE and supported units via a local area network (LAN). By linking to the ACE through the TS II, the DISE has connectivity with and access to the complete national-level multidiscipline capabilities provided by the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT). The

The 101st DISE sets up to support a brigade task force.

U.S. Army photos

DISE can process both sensitive compartmented information and collateral intelligence through the TS II. It can also provide the division or brigade task force (TF) with almost seamless connectivity to Intelligence Link (INTELINK) and other intelligence resources.

DISE Operations

When the DISE deploys in support of the Division Ready Brigade, it is prepared to integrate the capabilities of the organic MI slice into the total intelligence effort. The inclusion of a net radio protocol (NRP) capability in the DISE links the TF and the ACE with division-level signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities.

The 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) typically employs several low-level voice intercept teams, AN/TLQ-17 TRAFFICJAMs, AN/TRQ-32 TEAMMATEs, and QUICKFIX helicopters to provide tailored SIGINT collection for the TFs. Through the NRP, the DISE can receive and transmit data collected by the divisional assets to the ACE and can provide those assets with updates from the ACE and national-level agencies. We have found this capability invaluable in maximizing the capabilities of our divisional SIGINT assets. In addition to the NRP, the inclusion of the Commanders Tactical Terminal (CTT) takes SIGINT connectivity one step further and connects the DISE with such corps-level assets as the Guardrail Common Sensor.

While SIGINT, human intelligence, and measurement and signature intelligence all play critical roles on the battlefield, a picture can equal a thousand words. Thus, it is imagery that many tactical commanders desire. The TS II allows the DISE to receive imagery from the ACE and national-level agencies efficiently and quickly.

The Imagery at the 101st Airborne Division is typically sent from the Mobile Imagery Exploitation System (MIES) at the XVIII Airborne Corps to the MITT at the division for dissemination. The MITT operators take the imagery and post it to the ACE's WLNB LAN. The DISE can access this LAN through the TROJAN network, and can retrieve the images quickly.

The TS II also

Troopers of the 311th MI Battalion ACE preparing to "air assault" a TROJAN SPIRIT II.

gives us the capability to "pull" annotated secondary imagery directly from the Training and Contingency Division (TACD) at the Washington Navy Yard in the event that the ACE LAN is down. The challenge to our DISE is how to best get these pictures to the combat commanders.

There are several different means the DISE uses to provide connectivity and "push" intelligence to the brigade TF S2s. In a division's fight, the Mobile Subscriber Network (MSE) provides the primary link to the brigades. The DISE typically plugs into a small extension node (SEN) or a forced entry switch (FES) and creates an MSE LAN with adjacent units. This LAN allows the DISE to load intelligence reports, imagery, and situation overlays into the hard drive of a TF's RWS or WLNB LAN. A second means of connectivity is a direct hardwire connection from the TS II at the DISE to the division or brigade TF RWS. This configuration maximizes capability, but severely degrades the flexibility and mobility of the DISE.

Conclusion

The DISE concept in the 101st continues to evolve with each mission. The TS II is now routinely "air assaulted" and the DISE has proven mobile enough to keep up with an air assault TF. The DISE deploys to support division and brigade TF missions and exercises with connectivity, imagery, and intelligence products. As the DISE configurations and capabilities evolve, those configurations and capabilities are validated at the Combat Training Centers. All DISE soldiers are cross-trained, and their training is constant and intense. The DISE ensures that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) combat commanders' intelligence team is

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

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Communicating the Weather: The "Garske Chart"

by Major David L. Martens, USAF

It is well understood that accurate weather information is essential to the Army's success on the battlefield. Armed with a good weather forecast, the battlefield commander can exploit the changing nature of the atmosphere to his advantage. Expert use of the weather can be a force multiplier that can turn defeat into victory and victory into rout.

However, it must be communicated in a simple, straightforward manner. Even the best weather forecast will be of little use if it cannot be effectively communicated to the commander and his staff. The weather teams supporting the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) employ an effective communications tool that can quickly put the maximum amount of weather intelligence into the hands of the division's key decisionmakers. This useful communications tool is known throughout the division as the "Garske Chart."

Describing the Chart

Named after its developer, Master Sergeant Don Garske (U.S. Air Force), the Garske Chart displays 24 hours-worth of weather data and analysis required by the division staff. The chart shows a time evolution of weather elements deemed critical to planning the full range of division operations. On a single Garske Chart, a weather forecaster can display the day's solar and lunar data, as well as cloud cover, visibility, wind, and temperature forecasts. The Chart also provides space for remarks related to the weather effects on electro-optical weapons and night vision device usage.

By using this Chart, the battle staff can determine—in a single glance—what time the weather forecaster expects the fog to break, how low the cloud ceilings will be, and how high the temperature will be during the afternoon. During a briefing, the staff weather officer uses the Garske Chart as a jumping-off point to open a dialogue with the battle staff concerning the weather's effect on division missions. The chart is useful in determining the best time of day to launch an air assault or to schedule a reconnaissance flight to best minimize the negative effects of the weather on friendly operations.

To date, the Garske Chart has proven to be the most effective way to communicate critically needed weather information to the division staff. It fuses weather intelligence into the planning cycle to maximize the division's effectiveness in a frequently hostile and uncooperative environment. Using the Garske Chart, the division battle staff is determined to make "Mother Nature" an asset and an ally in its quest for battlefield dominance.

Interpreting the Chart

The Garske Weather Chart (see Figure 1) is normally prepared in color. *When this article is loaded on the Internet, it will have the full-color chart.* The chart includes the following data:

☐ **As of Date**. This is the date the Weather Chart was created.

☐ **AO Forecast and Date (or "D+ Day")**. The weather data is valid in the area of operations for this day.

☐ **ITO**. This is the Integrated Tasking Order for the day that starts at 0600L (local time).

☐ **Time**. The two timelines depict information in 2-hour intervals for both Zulu (Z) and local (L) times for a 24-hour period. The hashmarks under the times on each line correspond to the times listed at the top of the Chart.

☐ **Solar Data**. A black box depicts darkness, a gray one for twilight, and a yellow box for sunlight. **BMNT** (beginning morning nautical twilight), **sunrise**, **sunset**, and **EENT** (end evening nautical twilight) are listed, in that order, in local time.

☐ **Lunar Data**. The hours of moonlight are depicted by a blue box, with moonrise and moonset listed on each side of the box. The percentage of illumination is listed inside the blue box.

☐ **NVG**. The night vision goggle window displays the best time for NVG use. This row depicts the NVG window as a green box and shows the exact start and stop times on each side of the box. The criteria for the window are a moon elevation of at least 30 degrees and moon illumination of at least 26 percent.

☐ **Electro-Optics**. A purple box shows the forward-looking infrared (FLIR) window. A red line depicts the thermal crossover between the target and the background. The blank areas on each side of the red line correspond to times unfavorable for FLIR use (times when the temperatures of the target and background are within 2 degrees of each other). The FLIR window depicts the best time to use electro-optical systems. Thermal crossover refers to the worst time to use electro-optical systems (times when the targets cannot be distinguished from the background because their temperatures are equal).

☐ **Sky Condition**. This line shows the cloud coverage in terms of

how many clouds are present in the sky. The altitudes of the cloud bases are given in hundreds of feet. There are five categories of cloud cover shown in the chart:

- SKC (sky clear) refers to a cloudless sky.
- FEW refers to cloud coverage of 1/8-2/8 of the sky.
- SCT (scattered) refers to clouds present in 3/8-4/8 of the sky.
- BKN (broken) refers to cloud coverage in 5/8-7/8 of the sky.
- OVC (overcast) refers to solid clouds (over 8/8). A cloud level (in hundreds of feet) of 005 indicates that the base of the cloud is at 500 feet, 030 is 3,000 feet, and 200 means that the base of the clouds is at 20,000 feet above sea level.

☐ **Winds**. Winds are listed with the direction from which they are blowing and their exact speed in knots. Wind direction is based on a 360-degree circle. Figure 1 shows winds from a direction of 220 degrees (SW) at 10 knots.

☐ **Visibility**. The exact visibility is listed in miles. If there are any restrictions to visibility; the restrictor is stated after the visibility; e.g., 3 MILES FOG, 2 MILES SNOW, or 1 MILE BLDU (blowing dust).

☐ **Temp.** This line shows the temperature in 2-hour increments, either in degrees Celsius (C) or degrees Fahrenheit (F).

☐ **Snow Depth**. This is the average snow depth in valleys and on mountains (MTNS) for which operations are planned.

☐ **Hazards**. This line lists all the weather hazards that will affect operations. Turbulence is depicted as TURBC with intensities depicted as LGT (light), MDT (moderate), or SVR (severe). The altitude where the turbulence is present is given in hundreds of feet after the word TURBC. (On Figure 1, it is from the surface (SFC) to 10,000 feet.) Icing (ICG) has the same levels of intensity as were listed for turbulence, and the altitudes at which icing may occur are given in hundreds of feet. Thunderstorms are shown as TSTMS; it is assumed that lightning will be present for the duration of the thunderstorms. The freezing level (FRZ LVL) altitude is given in hundreds of feet. The time during which the hazards will take place are depicted by solid lines on each side of the hazard description. If there are no lines, the hazard will take place for the entire 24-hour period. Weather advisories and warnings may also be listed here, but they are usually disseminated by other means.

☐ **Sea State**. This gives the state of the sea as 1 (green), 2 (amber), or 3 (red). These sea states are based on U.S. Navy descriptions; the states incorporate such factors as wave height and wind speed. This information is used primarily for Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) and amphibious operations.

☐ **Color Legend**. The color legend in Figure 1 shows what the various colors mean.

Conclusion

The "Screaming Eagle" Weather Chart was developed as a tool for use in the mission planning process. It depicts all of the weather data significant to Army operations for a 24-hour period. Most importantly, it allows the commander to determine, **at a glance**, how the weather will influence future operations.

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

Figure 1. The Garske Chart.

Winning Battles with Weather

by Staff Sergeant Steven V. Scudder

A hard frost, a sudden thaw, a "hot spell," a "cold snap," a contrary wind, a long drought, a storm of sand—all these things have had their part in deciding the destinies of dynasties, the fortunes of races, the fate of nations. Leave the weather out of history, and it is as if night were left out of day, and winter out of the year.

—An *Atlantic Monthly* article, 1862

Weather has always played an important role in developing a complete intelligence picture for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). A good understanding of how weather affects different weapons systems can explain why an enemy has acted differently from a doctrinally expected approach. By understanding weather's effects, we in the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) have been able to enhance our forces' capabilities and identify enemy weaknesses. The weather forecasters, as active members of the 101st Airborne Division's intelligence team, have improved weapon systems performance and greatly increased mission success.

Weather Data Collection

In the 3d Brigade Combat Weather Team, we push this capability down to the individual soldier level. Figure 1 depicts the organizational structure of the weather personnel assigned to the 101st Airborne Division. Our weather personnel are spread throughout the 3d Brigade Task Force (TF) to provide support to the commanders and soldiers who will execute the battle plan. Every soldier in the 3d Brigade TF is a potential source of weather information. By covering a larger geographical (as well as structural) area, we can gather more information than our counterparts could in the past. In the event that we suffer a casualty inside the weather team organization, there is a functioning backup already in place. Another team member would acquire the responsibilities, and our weather support would not stop.

The collection and transmission of weather data is a key strategic and tactical element. The July-September 1997 *MIPB* article, "The Tactical Weather Initiative and the AWEs," by Mr. Jeffrey Faunce, provides the technological background behind our weather systems. This technology led our community to make the claim that we can gain a decisive tactical advantage through the exploitation of weather. Technology alone is not the solution to "owning and exploiting the weather"; rather it is how the unit uses the information. The process of disseminating weather products to the decisionmaker during briefings is every bit as important as the quality of the information. Providing the information in a presentation format that commanders at every level will understand and can use has become a major part of our weather team's mission.

Weather Effects on Targeting

Most commanders are concerned with weather primarily due to the effect that it can have on their weapons systems. Even slight changes in the humidity, ambient light, or precipitation intensity can significantly degrade weapons systems performance. To inform commanders of any possible weather degradations, our team creates a weather effects matrix that we present at each of the briefings to the commander. An example is shown in Figure 2.

In the 101st Airborne Division, the most noticeable aspect that weather has on our weapons is its effect on the targeting capabilities of our helicopters. In general, helicopters have achieved the ability to operate in **almost** any weather condition. However, it is a myth that our helicopters are **all-weather** weapons systems.

While thermal-imaging systems allow a pilot to see objects through smoke or fog, laser-sensing devices that appear on most helicopter weapons systems are subject to error when used in thick atmospheric conditions. Thermal imagery, such as infrared, senses emitted energy (heat) from a target and its background. In contrast, laser-sensing devices detect reflected energy that bounces off a target.

In dusty or foggy conditions, laser-guided weapons can miss their intended targets. For example, the laser can miss striking its target by three to four feet simply because the beam is deflected off its path by suspended dust particles. Sometimes, the pilot will detect a target, but his weapon system cannot "see" the target. The result is an increase in the percentage of misses recorded by our pilots, an increase in ammunition expenditure, and a degradation in time-on-station performance and mission accomplishment.

In the 101st Airborne Division, our combat weather teams act to forewarn the commanders and aircrews about the possible limitations of their weapons systems well in advance of the mission. Using Figure 2, a 101st Airborne Division forecaster running the Electro-Optics Tactical Decision Aids Program would have alerted the mission planners that they would


Figure 1. Division Combat Weather Team.

Date:	5-Sep-97	5-Sep-97	6-Sep-97	6-Sep-97	6-Sep-97	6-Sep-97	7-Sep-97	7-Sep-97
Time:	1800L	2400L	0600L	1200L	1800L	2400L	0600L	1200L
Vehicles								
Personnel								
NVG								
Field Artillery								
ADA								
Rotary Aviation								
CAS								
Airborne								
ACFT Recon								
Laser								
FLIR								
Use NBC								
Use smoke								
Dust								
Sea								
	GOOD		MARGINAL		POOR			

Figure 2.   Weather Effects Matrix.

need to adjust laser tactics to compensate for the weather conditions.

Preparing for Deployment

When the 3d Brigade TF is alerted for a deployment, we begin to prepare weather briefings for the area of operation. By studying the climatology, we can begin to identify possible advantages and problems for our brigade's weapons systems. The earlier we become involved in planning, the more significant a force multiplier the weather can become. The most successful elements of the 101st Airborne Division use their weather teams early in mission planning and in a very proactive manner.

The 3d Brigade S2 will task the weather section to search for **favorable** weather conditions that might affect a future mission. This approach gives the brigade a significant advantage over traditional weather usage. By looking for flyable conditions, the brigade expands its view, giving its system of battle the best possible chance for success. The brigade staff realizes that there is a connection between each part of the intelligence picture. Weather information alone is not that valuable without a "killer application." Including weather information in planning requires us to develop slides that present this information on timelines, as

on the chart in Figure 3. This technique meshes better with the aviation section's decisionmaking process and allows our team to have a greater impact on the mission-planning phase.

Conclusion

The 101st Airborne Division uses weather data to multiply its forces and increase its weapons' effectiveness. A commander can avoid a loss in combat power by altering attack times to compensate for negative weather conditions. Reducing our weather-related casualties and the loss of weapons systems increases the force available for action against the enemy. Our weather teams maintain a constant watch for conditions that might reduce the Division's infantry capabilities as well.

The 101st Airborne Division is developing a more integrated approach to intelligence and weather team analysis. By knowing what the mission goals and enemy situation are, we will be able to provide useful products directed at exploiting opportunities presented by atmospheric conditions. Early warning and lead time on weather conditions affecting weapons capabilities will aid the 101st Airborne Division's commanders in achieving their goals and avoiding the negative effects that weather can pose to an operation. A good intelligence shop with a fully integrated weather team will assure mission success and help prevent the "fog of war" from rolling in unannounced.

5-Sep-97	18L	19L	20L	21L	22L	23L	00L	01L	02L	03L	04L	05L	06L
MIN CIG	BKN250											BKN100	
MIN VIS	7 NSW											6-SHRA	
SFC Winds	24010KT	24005KT										24012KT	
FLGT Hazards	LGT TURBC												
TEMP	30	29	28	27	27	26	26	25	25	25	24	34	23
Light													
ILLUM	48%	45%	40%	37%	22%	20%	17%	5%					
Moon AZ	176	203	237	258	260	265	269						
Moon EL	70	64	56	47	31	23	4	-11	-23	-33	-48	-55	-67
	BMNT 6/0538 SR 6/0630 SS5/1725 EENT 5/1817												
	MR 6/1258 MS 6/0043												

DAY LIGHT		MOON LIGHT		TWI-LIGHT		NVG-LIGHT		DARK	

Figure 3. AO Weather Timelines.

Staff Sergeant Scudder is the Assistant Chief, Weather Station Operations, for the 19th Air Support Operations Squadron Weather Flight, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He is responsible for assisting the Chief, Weather Station Operations, in managing all aspects of weather support for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and its associated units. He has served as a weather observer at Grissom Air Force Base, Indiana, and Feucht Army Air Field, Germany, and as a weather forecaster at Williams Air Force Base, Arizona. SSG Scudder has an associate degree in Applied Science Weather Technology from the Community College of the Air Force. Readers can contact the author telephonically at (502) 798-3421 or DSN 635-3421 and via E-mail at scudders@campbell-emh5.army.mil.

TRAINING LINGUISTS IN THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT)

**by Sergeant First Class
David Robertson**

During the last few years, the linguists of the 311th Military Intelligence Battalion have played a key role in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Linguists from the 101st have performed well in many situations, from Operation DESERT STORM in the Middle East to JOINT GUARD in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and in operations in Haiti, South America, and Korea. Language diversity has been a key factor in their success, as collectively they speak several languages, including Arabic, Korean, and Serbo-Croatian.

Language Training in Garrison

Language training and maintenance is not an easy task. To ensure that the Division can maintain a source of fluent linguists to serve as interrogators and voice interceptors, as well as to achieve the U.S. Forces Command requirement of ten hours of language maintenance per week, the Division constructed a special language training annex in 1995. This $250,000 facility provides a site for training, resource materials, and instructors. Authentic language material is available via the Internet and satellite communications, and from current periodicals. These media allow soldiers to enhance their language capabilities with the latest news, politics, economics, and entertainment from around the world. On-hand reference material covers more than a dozen languages.

In November 1996, the Division established an intensive language training program in Arabic and Korean, courses taught by professional native speakers. Over the last year, the courses have increased from one week to four weeks in length. The training covers such topics as military vocabulary and situations, current events, geography, grammar, and everyday civilian situations in the country of interest. The student-to-instructor ratio has been as low as 2:1, and never higher than 6:1. An impressive 94 percent of the students have improved their qualification scores to meet or exceed the Army standard.

Worldwide Training Opportunities

Other training opportunities exist for these motivated liguists. They can further enhance their abilities in the tactical intelligence readiness training program or in live-environment training at numerous sites worldwide. There are also the opportunities to conduct language immersion training in various foreign countries and foreign language document exploitation at the National Ground Intelligence Center. Some of the more noteworthy assignment opportunities have been to Garmisch, Germany; Sanaa, Yemen; Camp Humphrey, Korea; and Malaga, Spain.

An additional Division asset to hone linguist skills is the TROJAN Classic system. It provides near-real-time native language, voice intercept capabilities, and the possibility of improving perishable military occupational specialty skills.

Retaining Linguists

Maintaining linguists and their skills is a difficult responsibility for the 311th MI Battalion due to duty assignment requirements. While Arabic linguists are assigned to us from two to four years, Korean linguists rarely remain at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, longer than one year. This usually provides a

U.S. Army photo

311th MI Battalion linguists use the internet for language training.

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DSN: 878-5312
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FUTURES

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MODERNIZATION AND INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIVITY IN ONE FELL SWOOP

by Captain Nelton Gaertner
and Second Lieutenant
Harry A. Janiski, Jr.

The AH-64 Apache helicopter is the most lethal killing platform on the modern battlefield. With a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) radar sighting system, the Apache can find almost any target in nearly any light condition. Seeing targets is also a way of gathering information which, when transmitted to intelligence cells, can be converted into useful intelligence. Equipment upgrades and improvements in connectivity to intelligence cells are helping the Apache to become a leading information collector on the battlefield.

The PhotoTelesis System

The current on-board gun-camera recording device, manufactured by TEAC, uses a special format tape that plays on a special format player and a special format monitor. This system, although innovative in the late 1970s when it was developed, seriously limits the capabilities of an otherwise powerful combat system.

PhotoTelesis, a division of Raytheon, has developed a new system to replace the antiquated TEAC recorder system. The new system has an integrated recorder, and transceiver capable of "freeze-framing" gun-camera imagery, transmitting the image over the aircraft's on-board secure radio systems, and receiving images from other aircraft or from ground stations. This system uses a standard 8-mm videocassette playable on any commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 8-mm video player or camcorder. The system also interfaces with the Army's new Lightweight Video Reconnaissance System (LVRS) allowing scouts or "pathfinders" on the ground to send near-real-time images of an engagement area or landing zone to aircraft already enroute.

The PhotoTelesis system is composed of four separate components:

☐ Tape recorder.

☐ Scan converter.

☐ Transceiver.

☐ Ground station.

The 8-mm tape recorder records the images viewed through the gun-camera and all cockpit conversation. The scan converter modifies the signal received by the recorder and changes it into a digital signal used by a Windows™ -based software program. The digital signal then passes into the transceiver where it is sent via FM (single channel or frequency hopping, secure or unsecure) ultra-high frequency, high frequency, or satellite communications to any of three consumers: (a ruggedized laptop computer loaded with special software), the ground station, the LVRS outstation, or another PhotoTelesis-equipped aircraft. The image can then be manipulated like any other image file.

Use by the 101st Aviation Brigade

This system has been used by the 101st Aviation Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), on several exercises. It has proven to be a useful tool and an excellent replacement for the Apache's standard TEAC recorder system. The system has also worked well in OH-58D Kiowa helicopters.

With a ground station in each battalion tactical operations center (TOC), the brigade S2 has instant connectivity for voice and data transmission through FM communications down to battalion level. Ground stations have passed text and graphic reports (such as intelligence reports and summaries), requests for information and requests for intelligence information, and even Word™ and PowerPoint™ files among the brigade and battalions. In this ca-

pacity, alone, the PhotoTelesis system has greatly increased the capability of the Intelligence battlefield functional area.

PhotoTelesis imagery (gun-camera imagery) also has greatly improved battle damage assessment (BDA) tracking and has increased the commander's situational awareness. Images such as those in Figures 1 and 2 can now be transmitted during or after an engagement and assessed by the S2 to determine whether the mission's success criteria have been met, or whether a reen-

gagement is required. The ability to make this decision while the aircraft are still in the air significantly saves time, logistics efforts, and initiative, keeping a minimum number of crews and aircraft at risk.

PhotoTelesis Connectivity Enhancement

Currently, the 101st Airborne Division G2 is working with the manufacturer of the PhotoTelesis system to develop a protocol to allow the Line-based Warlord

software to transmit over FM secure communications, thereby eliminating the need for Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) support down to the battalion level. Figure 3 illustrates the connectivity and information flow among the aircraft, to the ground stations, and from PhotoTelesis-equipped aircraft and LVRS-equipped pathfinders and scouts.

As Figure 3 illustrates, the images and data can be transmitted in any direction to any other system in the air or on the ground. Images can be downloaded onto


Figure 1. An AH-64 FLIR image transmitted 40 kilometers.

Figure 2. OH-58D daylight TV image transmitted 70 kilometers with digital retransmission.

Figure 3. PhotoTelesis Connectivity (Connectivity is Bi-directional).

KEY: EAD - Echelons Above Division.
LVRS - Lightweight Video Reconnaissance System.

LEGEND: ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ ‑ - Not a direct link.

a floppy diskette and imported into the Warlord system for assimilation into the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS). Similarly, data can be extracted from the ASAS/Warlord and can be inputted into the PhotoTelesis system for transmission to any of the systems. This provides equipped units with a workaround for the lack of Warlord connectivity down to battalion level.

The System's Shortcoming

Currently, only one serious shortcoming exists with the PhotoTelesis system: its range is limited by the radio system over which it transmits. In a deep attack role, this becomes a serious problem as distances covered often exceed 100 kilometers (km) and standard FM range with current systems is only about 45 km. Retransmission efforts have experienced some success; they work best when using a digital retransmission system like that on the OH-58D. To date, the analog retransmission systems have not worked well with PhotoTelesis.

Aircraft and vehicles equipped with new modes Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radio sets can retransmit digital data easily, but efforts with the older-model SINCGARS have failed. According to the manufacturer of the SINCGARS radios, data transmission **is possible** over the older-generation radios, but the operators have been unable to make it work. An LVRS outstation (a hand-held, integrated 486 computer and liquid crystal display screen), that is connected to a SINCGARS radio through the troop antenna on a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, has served as a relay system and provides an excellent workaround for the range problem and digital retransmission requirement. However, it does slow the information flow.

NTC rotation 98-02 will be a specially tailored rotation designed to experiment with and evaluate the communications architecture. The participants will include the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 101st Aviation Brigade. Our goals for the rotation include long-range FM (frequency-hopping, secure) transmissions with ground retransmission and the use of tactical satellite and HF radios.

Conclusion

The Marine Corps is experimenting with PhotoTelesis on Cobras and Harriers, and their Force Reconnaissance units currently use LVRS, although under a different name. The Air Force has used it in A-10s and the Navy has mounted it in F-14s. All Special Operations Forces use LVRS. The connectivity with other systems in our sister Services provides a new degree of joint-level interoperability and connectivity—a capability that the Army desperately needs in our JTF-oriented environment.

The PhotoTelesis system for the Apache helicopter will keep Army aviation at the cutting edge of technology and modern warfare, providing a much-needed upgrade to an already formidable system. Integration of PhotoTelesis with the newly acquired LVRS system will provide the aviation commander a level of situational awareness never before seen on the battlefield, while simultaneously providing mission planning staffs a valuable tool for reconnaissance and airflow coordination.

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ISE-McPherson: Intelligence for Third U.S. Army/ARCENT

by Sergeant First Class
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The mission of the Intelligence Support Element (ISE)-McPherson is to provide all-source intelligence analysis and production in direct support of Third U.S. Army and U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) at Fort McPherson, Georgia. ISE-McPherson is an intelligence detachment from the 297th Military Intelligence Battalion of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade, an echelons above corps (EAC) unit located at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

The ISE's strength derives from a dual chain of command that provides for its operational and support needs. On a daily basis, the ISE works for the ARCENT G2 to meet the ARCENT Commander's intelligence needs. However, the detachment's chain of command extends from the ISE Commander at Fort McPherson to the 297th MI Battalion Commander at Fort Gordon.

Background

Each corps in the U.S. Army has an organic MI brigade that supports its command. For example, the 525th MI Brigade supports the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 504th MI Brigade supports III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. Headquarters above the corps level also have organic MI brigades (like the 501st MI Brigade at Eighth U.S. Army in the Republic of Korea and the 513th MI Brigade at Third U.S. Army). These Army headquarters rely upon their EAC intelligence assets to satisfy intelligence requirements from the national level and below.

The assets of the 513th MI Brigade have been called upon by more than one major army command (MACOM) and commander in chief. Currently, they officially receive taskings from U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM), and Third U.S. Army.

The 297th MI Battalion has intelligence assets that are deployed around the world. Some of these are the III Corps' Corps Military Intelligence Support Element (CMISE) at Fort Hood, Texas; XVIII Airborne Corps' CMISE at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; B Company, 297th MI Battalion at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; ISE-McPherson at Third U.S. Army; and additional personnel assigned to augment the ARCENT forward headquarters in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. Figure 1 shows the intelligence systems communications architecture that exists between the ARCENT G2 components in these countries and the ISE at Fort McPherson.

When the Third U.S. Army/ARCENT Commander has an intelligence question, the ISE is his first stop. The mission of the ISE-McPherson is to keep the commander and his staff informed of the events that take place in the twenty countries that make up the ARCENT area of responsibility (AOR), as well as other world events that could influence the AOR. This is accomplished through briefings, intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), and other special products. The ISE also produces and analyzes all the current intelligence available at ARCENT headquarters. The ISE analysts stay in close contact with the 513th MI Brigade's Analysis and Control Element (ACE) at Fort Gordon and the analysts at CENTCOM, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other MACOMs and national agencies.

ISE Connectivity

The ISE is connected to the U.S. intelligence community through several automated systems, primarily the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). Through JDISS, the ISE has access to INTELINK (Intelligence Link), a classified intelli-

Figure 1. ARCENT G2 and ISE-McPherson Communications Architecture.

gence network similar to the Internet. National agencies and MACOMs have their own websites, which give the ISE access to many of their vast resources. These include current intelligence and historical data such as message traffic, unevaluated and finished data, summaries, and briefings. Figure 2 shows the ISE's communications links to other continental United States (CONUS)-based organizations.

JDISS also provides the ISE with the ability to transfer data and imagery files, send and receive E-mail, and reroute needed information to and from other intelligence sections around the world. This ability is especially critical for supporting ARCENT's

forward-deployed elements in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. When real-world situations arise in the AOR that may affect U.S. operations, the ISE cannot wait for the publication of the information in conventional formats. JDISS connectivity allows the intelligence community to react at a faster rate than those in the operations world. Analysts can contact the appropriate organizations to get the latest information and then disseminate it through the JDISS.

The ISE also uses the Army Message Handling System (AMHS) and the Defense Automated Warning System (DAWS). These systems enable analysts to search for and retrieve messages

from organizations that may not have an INTELINK website. They also give ready access to information that is not posted on the INTELINK sites.

The Defense Intelligence Threat Data System (DITDS) is another system used by the ISE to retrieve information. DITDS, in conjunction with DAWS and AMHS, is primarily used to provide current information to brief the commander every morning and for inclusion in the daily "read files." The information is usually available in these systems before it appears on INTELINK.

The ISE also uses the Warlord system, which adds many capabilities to the ISE's analysis efforts. Some of Warlord's functions

are the ability to monitor multiple moving target indicators (MTIs) on the battlefield, provide graphic INTSUMs, and maintain an order of battle database which can be plotted at various map scales. This system is linked directly to the 513th MI Brigade's ACE so it can be quickly updated with current information.

In addition to these systems, the ISE's imagery analysts use the Demand-Driven Direct Digital Dissemination (5D) server to provide the headquarters with up-to-date imagery. The imagery is used for command briefings, intelligence updates, verification of enemy ground movements, and ad hoc requirements from the commander and his staff.

Supporting Operations

During a crisis or during periods of heightened tension in the AOR, the ISE implements 24-hour operations in support of the forward-deployed units. When it is determined that an ARCENT headquarters presence is required in the AOR, the ISE deploys personnel to assist in the stand-up of the forward command post. The personnel that remain at ARCENT in Atlanta provide the continuity of support that is needed to ensure uninterrupted intelligence flow to the commander.

ISE personnel also deploy to the AOR in support of exercises and familiarize themselves with the AOR. They frequently meet with their counterparts from allied nations' for analyst-to-analyst discussions. These trips allow ISE


Figure 2. ISE Communication Links.

analysts to meet with the forward-based staffs, embassy personnel, and any 297th MI Battalion intelligence personnel who are deployed throughout the AOR at any given time. This gives them insight into how the ISE can better support the forward-deployed units with our coalition partners.

RC Integration

The ISE has the mission of integrating Reserve Component (RC) personnel into its day-to-day operations. When the ISE deploys personnel during crisis periods or major exercises, RC soldiers are brought on active duty to backfill the vacated positions. These RC soldiers must quickly be brought up to speed on the current situation so there is no lapse in coverage of the assigned areas. Even while involved in exercises, the real-world mission must continually be covered. At times, RC soldiers are brought in for other reasons, allowing them to get familiar with the operation under less-stressful conditions. Regardless of when or why RC soldiers

are brought in, it is the ISE's responsibility to train them.

Standard Unit Requirements

In addition to its daily intelligence mission, the ISE is responsible for the same administrative and training requirements as all other Army units. With a table of organization and equipment strength of 13 personnel, the ISE is not a full-size company. All assigned soldiers, from the commander down, conduct common task training, weapons training, weapons qualification, physical fitness training, and other training events that the Army requires. Unit personnel status reports must be submitted, as well as all other routine administrative actions. Most companies have a training noncommissioned officer (NCO), personnel services NCO, and clerks to assist with these tasks. The ISE has only one or two soldiers to take care of all the functions normally handled by a company staff.

Conclusion

Duty at ISE-McPherson is unusual, challenging, and exciting. Its mission focuses on one of the most strategically important areas of the world, the Middle East. The ISE stays vigilant to keep ARCENT ready—from an intelligence standpoint—to deploy to any hot spot early enough to project U.S. military power and to protect the United States' interests.

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ASAS Master Analyst Program
Sly Fox Den ASI 1F Notes

he role of the All-Source Analysis Systems' (ASAS) Master Analyst (additional skill identifier (ASI) 1F) and of the MI noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are complementary by design. The attainment of a "Master" level certification for technical and tactical proficiency is a crowning achievement in any field. This note will highlight some of the key responsibilities and roles for the ASAS Master Analyst (AMA).

The certified ASAS Master Analyst (also known as the "Sly Fox") is responsible for the training of assigned soldiers and leaders, troubleshooting the system, and performance of intelligence analysis with the ASAS. The AMA's roles in the Analysis and Control Element (ACE) are to be an advocate, planner, and developer. These responsibilities and roles are keys in the successful accomplishment of the ACE's mission.

The ASAS Master Analyst provides both unit NCOs and officers in the ACE with a subject matter expert to facilitate the optimization of ASAS capabilities. These capabilities are successfully achieved through mission and system integration. The AMA serves as the primary point of contact on any issues relating to ASAS for unit commanders, NCOs, and soldiers.

The responsibilities and roles of the AMA demand mission and leader expertise. The NCO who meets the stringent training and certification requirements is prepared to "take charge," produce intelligence for the commander, and be always out front.

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The Easter Offensive of 1972: A Failure to Use Intelligence

by W. R. Baker

It was not Intelligence (evaluated information of the enemy) that failed. The failure was [that of] the commanders and certain G2s, who did not act on the intelligence they had.

—Colonel Robert S. Allen, on
The Battle of the Bulge[1]

Like the Battle of the Bulge, the 1972 Easter Offensive in Vietnam has often been referred to as an "intelligence failure," mainly because it caught the United States and South Vietnam completely by surprise. A look beneath the surface, however, reveals that U.S. and South Vietnamese combat commanders were aware of significant changes in the posture of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and had access to many indicators of an impending NVA offensive. Colonel Allen's assessment that commanders at The Bulge failed to embrace the intelligence available to them holds true when evaluating why American and South Vietnamese forces failed during the Easter Offensive, as well.

Several factors contributed to the success enjoyed by the NVA during the Easter Offensive. First, the U.S. and South Vietnamese commanders failed to use all of the intelligence available to them. Their overconfidence, coupled with command and control (C^2), and communications problems, violated the cardinal rule of "never underestimate your enemy."

Also, Allied commanders relied on only two of the three forms of intelligence—imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). In ignoring human intelligence (HUMINT) data, they overlooked the most accurate forecast of enemy intentions leading up to the Easter Offensive.

Background

While most areas of South Vietnam encountered NVA ground force activity during the Easter Offensive of 1972, it was the northern-most portion of the country, the Quang Tri Province, which bore the initial and most severe brunt of the NVA's conventional ground campaign. The offensive began with an extensive artillery bombardment just before noon on Good Friday, 30 March 1972. Only the 1st ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) (Hue) and 3d ARVN (Quang Tri) Divisions, the 147th and 258th Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) Brigades, and the understrength 20th ARVN Tank Battalion stood in the way of the NVA onslaught into the northern provinces.

The North's plan of attack was relatively simple. The 324B NVA Division, supplemented by two infantry regiments (the 5th and 6th) that had made their way south from North Vietnam, would engage the 1st ARVN Division, widely considered to be the ARVN's best. Operating from its usual B-4 Front staging area in the A Shau Valley west of the Hue, these NVA units would preempt any possibility of relief to the north by applying pressure to the firebases west of Hue and, thereby, to the city of Hue itself. However, the 1st ARVN had conducted offensive operations during March that precluded any B-4 Front operations from achieving surprise before Good Friday. At the same time, the 3d ARVN—comprised of three infantry regiments (the 2d, 56th and 57th), the attached 20th Tank Battalion, and the two VNMC brigades—was prepared to face the onslaught of the NVA's B-5 Front, bounding down from the north.

Nevertheless, the enemy struck with speed and accuracy at the weakest link along the line. The offensive began with the 308th NVA Division and the attached 204th Tank Regiment springing from the western Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Concurrently, what

246th and 270th Infantry Regiments

308th NVA Dvision
204th Tank Regiment

27th Infantry Regiment
31st Infantry Regiment
126th Infantry Regiment

Camp Carroll

203d Tank Regiment

Khe Sanh

Dong Ha

304th NVA Division

Quang Tri

324th NVA Division

5th and 6th Infantry Regiments

Hue

The Easter Offensive - 1972

amounted to (and perhaps was) a division-sized task force composed of three independent infantry regiments (the 27th, 31st, and 126th Sapper) and the 201st Tank Regiment, jumped off from the eastern portion of the DMZ.

Meanwhile, the 304th NVA Division (which had infiltrated from Laos) and the attached 203d Tank Regiment arrived in the Khe Sanh area and attacked eastward, eventually linking up with the 246th and 270th Infantry Regiments on its left flank. This assault from the west allowed the NVA to conduct flanking attacks towards Quang Tri City and, most importantly, enabled some units to become a blocking force against any attempt to relieve the 3d ARVN from the south. Additionally, there was an intelligence report that indicated that the 324B NVA Division detached two of its three regiments (the 29th and the 812th) in an attempt to strike northeastward towards Quang Tri during this period.

Essentially, the NVA forces had achieved a lightning-fast victory that sealed off the 3d ARVN Division from its reinforcements and relief. Striking at the weak link along the Allied line, the NVA completely surprised the Allied forces. Or did they? History tells us that the Allies had prior knowledge of NVA activity in preparation for the attack, but did not use that information to the maximum extent possible.

Reluctance to Use Intelligence

Indications of some sort of offensive were forecast—first during Tet, then in March. The NVA's 324B Division was known to be headed for their usual AO in the A Shau Valley. A slight buildup across the DMZ was detected, but it was not enough to cause any great alarm.

Despite the buildup, most Allied commanders were confident that the NVA could not sustain an offensive so soon after Tet. The South Vietnamese I Corps com-

mander, when presented with the idea of a North Vietnamese attack across the DMZ, bluntly stated, *"They cannot."* [2] His U.S. counterpart at the First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC) agreed, *"His appraisal appeared reasonable and well-founded."* [3]

Also, despite the known NVA buildup across the DMZ, the 3d ARVN commander, Brigadier General Vu Van Giai, decided to swap the positions of the 2d and 56th Regiments, creating a situation where his forces would be in transition. Unfortunately, they were in the process of switching positions when the Offensive began. In fact, NVA shelling began less than thirty minutes after both regiments' communications shut down. Coincidence? Or, rather, evidence of good enemy use of intelligence?

A South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) account later claimed that there was a countrywide alert on March 29. If so, the word of the alert never arrived at Military Region-1 (MR-1) or the Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (MACV), or it was largely ignored by those commands. Otherwise, U.S. Air Force and Republic of Vietnam Air Force aircraft would have attempted to preempt offensive operations in the days and weeks prior to the offensive. Also, U.S. and South Vietnamese ground units would have been on alert and the two regiments of 3d ARVN would not have been changing AOs.

C² Problems

In Vietnam, C^2 was problematic. The leadership provided by the South Vietnamese commanders was rarely exemplary. The I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, who was more a political general than a military commander, often exhibited inept and indecisive leadership. To compound the problem in I Corps, the Corps' headquarters had *"never actually functioned as a field headquarters in*

combat," as the FRAC commander later admitted.[4]

However, the most infamous example of the dearth of ARVN leadership was the surrender of the 56th ARVN Regiment by Lieutenant Colonel Phan Van Dinh, its commander, at Camp Carroll after a short fight on Easter Sunday. Many other examples of cowardice occured during the Offensive, but none was so flagrant or damning.

To add to the Allies' C^2 woes, there was a distinct lack of cohesion in coordinating the efforts among the army and marine corps units in MR-1. The 147th VNMC Brigade at Mai Loc and the 258th VNMC Brigade at Fire Support Base Nancy were technically attached to the 3d ARVN Division. The 3d did not, however, have operational control (OPCON) over these units—the I Corps commander did. The Vietnamese Marines were also considered part of South Vietnam's strategic reserve—a reserve whose squandering would ruin their commander's career. As a result of this C^2 confusion, the VNMC units located with the 3d ARVN were under-utilized during the Offensive.

Finally, MACV was receiving most of its intelligence third-hand from Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) in Hawaii. In addition to providing offshore naval gunfire support, U.S. Navy destroyers, with the naval intelligence liaison element in Da Nang, were presumably providing the PACFLT Commander in Hawaii with more timely tactical situational reporting than the MACV commander, General Creighton Abrams, was receiving from I Corps. The destroyers were not OPCON to MACV or I Corps and, therefore, reported directly to the PACFLT Commander. He, in turn, relayed the reports from Hawaii back to Saigon. *"As it turned out, it was up to three days after the enemy attack was launched in MR-1 before it aroused any major*

concern in Saigon," the JGS Assistant J2 stated years later.[5] Across the board, C^2 was not very smooth for the Allied forces.

Ignoring HUMINT

During the Easter Offensive, two of the three pillars of intelligence, IMINT and SIGINT, supplied some indicators of what was about to occur. However, it was the ignoring of the third pillar, HUMINT, that ended up shaping the incorrect opinion among Allied commanders that the NVA offensive was unlikely and, even after it began, that it was doomed to failure.

IMINT provided the first real clues of the NVA buildup north of the DMZ. U.S. photographic intelligence missions detected a large concentration of tanks near Bat Lake, where the borders of North and South Vietnam met the border of Laos.

Although no information is currently available concerning the Easter Offensive radio SIGINT intercepts prior to March 30 (nor afterwards), it is reasonable to assume that the NVA communications security (COMSEC) measures and traffic minimization were in effect. However, sensor activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail was unusually active with "movers" during February and March.

Although there has been little written on SIGINT reporting during the Easter Offensive, it can be presumed that there were, in fact, few SIGINT intercepts during that period, especially when one considers the actions **not taken** by the Allied forces. If SIGINT had indicated the NVA buildup, the MACV commander would probably have returned early from his rest and recuperation in Thailand or perhaps would not have left South Vietnam at all. In addition, a country-wide alert generated by SIGINT intercepts of NVA offensive preparations would have alerted U.S. forces, thus precluding the senior U.S. Army advisor

to 3d ARVN from leaving for an Easter visit to Saigon.

While IMINT and SIGINT provided some clues as to the NVA's intentions during March, HUMINT provided the most accurate forecast of enemy intentions before the Offensive. In December 1971, a "usually reliable source"[6] had provided a significant document, a North Vietnamese Politburo policy, which indicated that the Viet Cong/NVA would switch over to "main force" rather than "protracted" warfare operations.

Then, on March 27, a friendly ambush southwest of Firebase Pedro yielded unexpected results. One of the dead NVA soldiers carried a map showing all of the trails, streams, firebases, and units in Quang Tri Province.

A U.S. intelligence unit even predicted the NVA's preliminary objectives in advance of the Offensive. Based on agent reports, the 1st Battalion (Provisional), 525th MI Group, constructed a detailed description of the major NVA units, their commanding officers, and the date the Offensive was to begin. Using the intelligence summary (INTSUM) for the first time in the 525th MI Group's history in Vietnam, their predictive analysis was sent electronically to the 525th MI Group, MACV, U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV) and 7th Air Force Headquarters. It was carried by courier to the FRAC, naval intelligence liaison, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 1st MIBARS (Military Intelligence Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance Squadron), the Central Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Army Special Forces in the Da Nang area **before** the Easter Offensive began. Their reporting continued for many weeks afterwards.

Despite the reliable HUMINT analysis sent to them, the American command took a lot of time to realize the true intent of the NVA offensive in the north. It was not until 27 April 1972, 28 days **after** the offensive had started, that the

FRAC wrote to the MACV commander:

Reports are fragmentary at this time but intelligence indicates that the objectives are the capture of Fire Support Base Nancy and to establish a blocking force on the Quang Tri/Thua Thien border. Other NVA forces will then assume offensive operations to capture Quang Tri City.[7]

In fact, the HUMINT INTSUMs from the 525th MI Group had predicted weeks ahead of the attack that Quang Tri City, and not Hue, was the objective of the NVA action.

Obviously, the main lesson here is that neither SIGINT nor IMINT are the sole foundation of intelligence. They should be treated as two of many elements that make up **all-source** intelligence analysis. During the 1972 Easter Offensive, the lack of SIGINT collected was, in and of itself, a possible indicator. SIGINT cannot (and should not) be the crux or final determining factor in assessing enemy intentions or capabilities.

Conclusion

The Easter Offensive caught the Allies by complete surprise—needlessly so. While the indicators of attack were numerous, U.S. and South Vietnamese commanders ignored them in favor of a more reassuring position: that the NVA could not and would not attack before the end of March. Their failure to use HUMINT to the fullest extent possible also contributed to the Allied forces being caught off guard. The "intelligence failure" during the Easter Offensive was less a failure to collect intelligence than it was a failure to exploit obvious indicators.

Endnotes

1. Colonel Robert S. Allen, **Lucky Forward** (New York: Manor Books, 1965), 157.

2. Dale Andrade, **Trial by Fire** (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1995), p. 62.

UNTAES:

A Success Story in the Former Yugoslavia

by Captain David Sterling Jones

Since 1991, the story of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has been one of bloodshed and missed opportunities for a peace not seen in Europe since the end of World War II. Likewise, most observers say that the United Nations' (U.N.) efforts to bring peace to the region during this same period have also been bloody and ill-planned. Few would look back on the efforts of U.N. Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) or U.N.

Confidence Restoration Operations (UNCRO) in Croatia and find much to claim as a success.

Actually, the United Nations has done much to contribute to peace in the FRY. Since the deployment of the Dayton Accords Implementation Force (IFOR), followed by the deployment of the Stabilization Force (SFOR), little has been heard of the earlier U.N. Missions, although they have continued to operate. The preventive deployment of the U.N. Observer Mission Prevlaka (UNMOP) and the United Nation's Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) are missions that continue to make a positive contribution to the fragile peace in the FRY.

As demonstrated by UNTAES, the mandate and actions of a U.N. mission can have far-reaching effects in the Balkans. The UNTAES mission, its origin, and, more importantly, the course that UNTAES has taken recently are key factors in understanding one of the few success stories of the United Nations in the Balkans.

Background

The UNTAES region is an area consisting of 2,300 square kilometers, comprised of the Baranja, Eastern Slavonia, and Western Sirmium regions of eastern Croatia (see Figure 1). The region borders Hungary to the north and shares the Danube River as a border with the FRY. Eastern Sla-

Figure 1. The UNTAES Region in Europe.

vonia is a broad fertile plain, whose agricultural yield helped the region to enjoy one of the highest per capita incomes in the FRY. It served as the FRY's granary and also has significant oil deposits in the south. Historically, the area has been inhabited by a mixed population of Croats, Serbs, Hungarians, and others.

In May 1991, the people held a referendum regarding Croatia's future in the Yugoslav federation. Just one month after the referendum, on 25 June 1991, the Republic of Croatia declared its independence. Shortly after the declaration, Serbs who were living in Croatia intensified their armed insurrection against the Croatian Government. As part of the broader conflict which broke out throughout Croatia, Eastern Slavonia was overrun by the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA), a force led by a Serb-majority officer corps and aided by Serb paramilitary. The city of Vukovar suffered a four-month-long siege by the JNA that destroyed eighty percent of the city. All sides committed a number of war crimes during and after the fighting, which led the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to indict three JNA officers and the former

The Vukovar water tower, a symbol of the Croatian Defenders.

Photos courtesy of the author.

Mayor of Vukovar, Slavko Dokmanovic, for the execution of more than 200 Croatian prisoners of war at Ovcara Farm. The Serb forces eventually seized control of the region which now makes up the UNTAES area of responsibility.

Between 1992 and 1995, the area—called United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) Sector East—saw continued, although greatly reduced, hostilities between the warring factions. Hostilities were kept to a minimum by the presence of U.N. peacekeep-

A Pakistani (PAKBAT) T-59 providing security on election day.

ers who were part of UNPROFOR (March 1992 through March 1995) and UNCRO (April 1995 through January 1996). In May and August 1995, Croatian forces conducted offensive operations which recaptured all portions of Serb-held territory in Croatia, except for UNPA Sector East. By Fall 1995, it was clear that unless the Serb local authorities and the Croatian Government could come to an agreement on the eventual return of UNPA Sector East to Croatian control, the Croatian Army, Hrvatska Volska (HV), would use military force and the Yugoslav Army, Volska Jugoslaviji (VJ), might be drawn into the battle in support of the local Serb forces, Srpske Volska Krajina (SVK).

The UNTAES Mission

On 12 November 1995, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter

Galbraith and U.N. Special Envoy Thorvald Stoltenberg negotiated a "Basic Agreement" (also known as the Erdut Agreement) between the local Serb authorities and the Croatian Government. The agreement provided the framework for resolving the last major territorial conflict within the borders of the Republic of Croatia. The talks commenced in September 1995 and amounted to the first step of the Dayton process.

The "Basic Agreement" called for the United Nations to establish a transitional authority and to de-ploy an international force. The force's mission was to demilitarize the region, monitor the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and conduct local elections. U.N. Security Council Resolution Number 1037 established UNTAES on 15 January 1996.

The UNTAES mandate clearly states that the Mission's objective is the peaceful reintegration of the territory under its administration into Croatia. The mandate has been extended until 15 January 1998, although a gradual drawdown of its military forces began on 15 July 1997.

The mission is headed by Transitional Administrator Jacques Paul Klein, a senior American Foreign Service Officer (and Air Force Reserve Major General). He is accompanied by seventeen personnel detailed from the U.S.

Serbs demonstrate outside the UNTAES Headquarters in Vukovar.

Armed Forces and the State Department. At its height, UNTAES' military forces included more than 5,000 troops from Argentina, Belgium, The Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and The Ukraine.[1] UNTAES also employs approximately 700 civilians, 455 U.N. civilian police, 100 U.N. military observers (UNMOs), and 41 border monitors from various nations.

Accomplishments

After deploying to the area in April 1996, UNTAES successfully demilitarized the region area by 20 June 1996. Serb military and paramilitary units were disbanded and all heavy weapons were removed from the area.

Since demilitarization, UNTAES has made progress in the political tasks of reintegration. It has opened a communications and transport infrastructure, as well as international bus and train services. It has won significant employment guarantees in public services for the local residents and established a multi-ethnic Transitional Police Force. Also, UNTAES obtained access to Croatian citizenship papers for all the region's residents. Finally, elections under Croatian law for the area's local authorities were held on 13 April 1997.

UNTAES and ICTY

The UNTAES mandate clearly states that the "fullest support" will be provided to the members of the ICTY in their investigation of war crimes, excavation of grave sites, and apprehension of war criminals. Accordingly, Transitional Administrator Jacques Klein issued guidance to both the military and civilian proponents of UNTAES to use mission resources to assist the ICTY. This support includes aiding in the investigation of war crimes, excavation of grave sites, and the apprehension of war criminals.

While UNTAES has assisted in the excavation of many mass grave sites, its support to ICTY also led to the 27 June 1997 arrest of suspected war criminal Slavko Dokmanovic, wanted for his participation in the Ovcara massacre of more than 200 Croatian prisoners of war. The successful capture of Dokmanovic was the result of the United Nation's thorough planning, good coordination with the ICTY, and willingness to break away from past "modus operandi" in its conduct of military operations. The pitfalls and successes of that process will be presented in a future article.[2]

Conclusion

As the UNTAES mission nears its conclusion, it is clear to observers of the FRY that the nationalist ambitions and ethnic hatreds that led to and fueled the "Wars of Yugoslav Succession" have yet to vanish from the people's minds. As witnessed in the successful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia, the United Nations is learning from its past failures and applying these lessons to current missions. As Transitional Administrator Jacques Klein moves from the UNTAES mission to the position of Deputy High-Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he will carry a clear mandate and the knowledge of how to achieve that mandate.

The arrest of Slavko Dokmanovic and the subsequent arrest of another indicted war criminal by British SFOR troops on 10 July 1997 signal a turning point in the FRY. Clearly U.N. and SFOR missions in the FRY are joined in the venture and will taste the "*sweet wine of success*" or "*the grapes of wrath*" together.

Endnotes

1. The United States did not provide part of the UNTAES military force.
2. See the April-June 1998 issue of the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* for the second part of this article.

Captain Dave Jones currently serves as the Operations Group S2 at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). As an artillery officer, he served with the 1st Armor Division as a Battalion Fire Support Officer during Operation DESERT STORM and later as the Division Artillery S2. CPT Jones served as an armor battalion S2 and as a company commander in Korea. While serving as a Task Force S2 Observer/Controller at the CMTC, he attended the U.N. Military Observer and Staff Officer courses in Finland and Ireland. CPT Jones served as the Special Assistant to the Transitional Administrator for UNTAES from January through July 1997. He is a graduate of the Johns Hopkins University ROTC program. Readers can contact the author via E-mail at jonesd@cmtc.7ATC.army.mil and telephonically at German civilian telephone 011 09472 83 2033 and DSN (315) 466-2033.

Enlisted Leader Development Network

Released by the Public Affairs Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the Active Component, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard now have a formal way to raise their leader development issues within the NCO Corps. This capability is part of the newly established Enlisted Leader Development Network (ELDN), proposed by the Leader Development Office of the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA).

The process—which replaces a system that was not user-friendly—allows soldiers to bring leadership development issues forward for discussion or resolution. The network puts into place a system that allows the review and assessment of leadership issues, and monitors courses of action (COAs) to ensure that NCO leader development produces qualified soldiers and NCOs capable of training and leading soldiers.

A CAL spokesperson at the Command and General Staff College said that the deputy commandant of the Command and General Staff College is the Army Chief of Staff's executive agent for leader development in the U.S. Army. The leader development program includes officers, warrant officers, enlisted, Reserves, National Guard, and civilians. **Army Regulation 600-100, Army Leadership**, tasks CAL's Leader Development Office with assessing, developing, coordinating, and monitoring all leader development issues from concept to completion.

The ELDN process comprises six steps to support the leadership assessment system. These six steps are receiving the issues, assigning the lead and assisting agencies, posting it to the website, briefing the sergeants major (SGMs), entering the issue into the Leader Development Support System (LDSS), if necessary, and following up with the source.

The ELDN spokesperson defined leader development as having three pillars: institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. These are the areas that the network is designed to address. He stressed that the network was not established to tackle personal or chain-of-command type problems, but rather leader development issues that affect the NCO corps in general.

Entering the network is simple. The address for the ELDN home page is **http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cal/eldn/eldnfr.htm**. Once on the home page, the system prompts the individual(s) wishing to address a leader development issue to provide requested information (name, organization, telephone number, and E-mail address). They are asked to provide as much information as possible to support the issue: to state the problem, explain why it should be changed, and propose a solution. The person who initiates the issue need not be an NCO, although the network addresses NCO leadership concerns.

Interested parties can submit issues by methods other than the ELDN website. They include E-mail (eldn@leav-emh.army.mil), telephone (commercial (913) 758-3217 or DSN 585-3217), and U.S. mail. The mailing address is Command and General Staff College, Center for Army Leadership, ATTN: SGM Jessen, Eisenhower Hall Building #120, Room 151, 250 Gibbon Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314.

The issue will be reviewed and logged by the CAL Leader Development Office SGM to ensure the issue is a bona fide leader development issue. The review also determines a lead and assist agency, which is then tasked through the Sergeant Major of the Army to assess the issue. An issue might involve one of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools, for instance.

The proponent SGM for the school would become the lead agent, but he may need assistance from TRADOC, especially if the issue involves changing allotted time for a program of instruction. The TRADOC command sergeant major (CSM) would then be involved as the assisting agent. At the same time the lead and assist agencies are tasked, the issue would be sent to the field for discussion among senior SGMs and CSMs. The lead and assist agencies do the assessment of the issue. This includes conducting a needs assessment, drafting the recommendation, identifying points of contact, establishing milestones and completion dates, identifying resources, tracking discussion, developing COAs, reporting current status to the CAL proponent office, and assisting in briefing the Enlisted Leaders Development Council (ELDC).

The next step in the network is for the CAL SGM to personally brief the members of the ELDC. This is done semiannually or as the Sergeant Major of the Army directs. The council receives briefings on all issues: proposed issues, current open issues, and issues completed since the last briefing.

Each member of the ELDC receives a "read-ahead" packet with the issues prior to the briefing

Wargaming at NTC: Decision Point—PIR Linkage

by Lieutenant Colonel
Thomas M. Smith

A problem often seen here at the National Training Center (NTC) is that of S2s and commanders struggling with the development of priority intelligence requirements (PIR). We determine PIR early, which usually provides inadequate focus for our reconnaissance effort. In addition, we require the S2 to respond to new requirements for intelligence and analysis from the commander, often during the heat of battle. Why? Because S2s often fail to—

☐ Understand the full set of feasible courses of action (COAs) available to the enemy.

☐ Consider the effect of our COAs on the full set of enemy COAs (ECOAs).

☐ Develop their COAs to deal with and wargame the effects of all remaining feasible ECOAs (and thereby plan for the essential decisions that the commander must make to deal with all ECOAs).

☐ Adjust their PIR based on the results of the wargame.

For example, assume that the S2 did a good job of laying out the full set of ECOAs during mission analysis. The S2 also estimates what he thinks the commander's PIR ought to be, usually receiving the commander's stamp of approval. Often, that is as far as we go. During the wargame, the staff determines in significant detail how to synchronize the fight against the S2's most probable ECOA—but little else.

During the fight, the S2 will, of course, be focused on answering the commander's PIR. The enemy may not "cooperate" (not

attack using the S2's most probable ECOA) and therefore may be attacking away from where our main defensive effort is concentrated. The commander may have to make decisions that change the brigade's task organization or perhaps even move an entire task force during the course of the fight. He often ends up asking the S2 questions not related to our PIR—questions that the S2 may not be prepared to answer.

In our example, the S2 did the first thing that S2s often fail to do: understand the full set of feasible ECOAs available to the enemy. S2s, you are primary staff officers, just like the S3. Speak up! Do not allow your S3 to wargame only the most probable ECOA. Your S3 may think that you do not have time to wargame all possible ECOAs. The fact is that you do not **need** to wargame them all. Based on our choice of a friendly COA (and/or the receipt of additional intelligence), the likelihood of the enemy's adopting a given ECOA may be reduced.

To illustrate the effect of the friendly COA on the ECOAs we briefed during mission analysis, refer to Figure 1. In this example, the S2 laid out seven feasible ECOAs during mission analysis (left side of the figure). As a friendly COA (center) is developed, we can assess the feasibility and probability of each ECOA (right side). Because of our chosen COA, we might deduce that some ECOAs are no longer feasible and that we should adjust their relative probability and thus, our priority in planning against them.

The S2 should take these remaining ECOAs to the wargame, so that the staff can ensure that they identify the key friendly decision points (and the associated enemy and friendly criteria) for the commander to successfully deal with all of the remaining feasible ECOAs. The wargame results give us the basis for refining our PIR. With clear enemy criteria for each decision, we can and should adjust our PIR. Both the new PIR and the overall decisions that the staff has identified should be


Figure 1. ECOA Feasibility, Probability, and Assessment Process.

briefed to the commander if he was not present for the wargame. With the commander's concurrence on the adjusted PIR and the decisions associated with them, the S2 and the rest of the staff have a means to focus the reconnaissance effort and their predictive analysis during the fight. The S2 will be prepared to provide the commander with the intelligence he needs to make the essential decisions necessary to win the fight.

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Keys to S2 Success at JRTC

by Captain Wayne Barefoot

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) challenges intelligence teams with a formidable array of threats. A tough physical environment, an aggressive and competent opposing force (OPFOR), and observer/controllers (O/Cs) who hone in on mistakes are only a few of the challenges intelligence professionals face here. These factors give units that train at the JRTC one of the best, and toughest, learning environments short of actual conflict. Units that arrive at the JRTC prepared for these challenges depart better trained, and with a clear vision of how they can continue to improve at their home stations. For those that arrive unprepared, however, the training experience here can prove to be frustrating and not as productive.

This article lays out a framework for the train-up of intelligence sections preparing for future JRTC rotations. It is based on seven areas the intelligence O/Cs have identified as the keys to success. These areas are:

☐ Section operations.
☐ Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
☐ Staff integration.
☐ Asset usage.
☐ Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S).
☐ Pattern analysis.
☐ Intelligence support to targeting.

These recommendations have proven successful and can focus the training efforts for S2 sections or military intelligence companies as they prepare for their next JRTC rotations or actual operational deployment.

Section Operations

Solid section operations form the basis for everything the S2 section, brigade Analysis and Control Team (ACT), or MI company headquarters does. In turn, a detailed standing operating procedure (SOP) forms the basis for these operations. Good SOPs contain a number of items; this article identifies only a few crucial ones. First, SOPs should identify those tasks the section performs, then break those tasks down into discrete subtasks. It should describe these subtasks in detail and assign each one to an individual within the section. The SOPs should then specify when these subtasks must be completed.

This portion of the SOP clearly identifies who is responsible for accomplishing what, and when it must be accomplished. This level of detail provides a great tool for supervisors to keep the section effort on track. It helps integrate new soldiers into the section by identifying their responsibilities, and identifies for leaders the subtasks others must cover when soldiers become casualties or are otherwise unavailable.

Next, a series of checklists in the SOP should drive the section's precombat inspections (PCIs). Repeatedly, we find that poor PCIs lead to mission failure. PCI checklists should identify important pre-mission coordination actions, and contain an inventory checklist for mission-essential equipment and other items. The exhortation, "Don't forget nothin'," is as applicable for an ACT as it is for a rifle squad. If something is important enough that its loss might jeopardize mission accomplishment, then a leader should personally inspect it.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

IPB analyzes the possibilities and limitations imposed by the area of operations (AO) and the enemy's capabilities. It culminates, ultimately, in descriptions of the enemy's possible COAs, and the probabilities of each COA occurring. Several IPB products play a big role in the S2's ability to arrive at this accurate projection of the enemy's most probable activities.

One important IPB product is the modified combined obstacles overlay (MCOO). The terrain analysis products comprising the MCOO come from many sources. S2 sections prepare some, while others come from supporting topographic teams and national agencies. Successful S2s combine all of these pieces before deployment to come up with an analysis of the opportunities and limitations the terrain poses for friendly and enemy forces. Similarly, enemy order of battle (OB) is generally available before deployment. (Even forced insertion units usually undergo a protracted X-Hour sequence, with an intelligence build-up, before deploying.) This OB data should also be analyzed before deployment to determine the capabilities the enemy will bring to the fight. Typically, a combination of OB

charts and descriptions of enemy capabilities, broken down by functional areas, expresses this analysis.

For the most part, S2 sections are good at this initial analysis. However, many fail to update these products as they gather new information. The O/Cs often find excellent terrain analysis and OB products stashed away in corners of tactical operations centers and vehicles. With minimal refinement, these terrain products can serve S2s and other staff members well, as they assess the effects of the battlefield area on subsequent operations. Enemy OB is also dynamic, and S2s and ACTs must constantly account for enemy attrition and reinforcements if they intend to accurately identify the enemy's future capabilities.

The result of this analysis should be complete and clearly depicted ECOAs. Most S2s express these through their situation templates. The situation template should graphically portray as much as it can about the ECOAs. As a minimum, it should identify the likely locations of maneuver units, probable unit boundaries, fire support (FS) and combat service support locations, command and control nodes, land and air routes, infiltration lanes, and objectives.

In short, the perfect situation template should closely resemble the enemy S3's operational graphics. In practice, the quality of these templates varies widely,

but even the best situation template never, by itself, portrays the full enemy picture. S2s must also identify the enemy's high-value targets (HVTs), and should give a narrative describing the full enemy battlefield framework. We recommend that S2s present this narrative in four sections: enemy task, purpose, method of accomplishing the task, and desired end-state. An example of this is shown in Figure 2.

Finally, successful S2s take the necessary extra step to create an event template. The event template forms the basis of all R&S efforts, and incorporates the all-important element of time-distance analysis into the process. This allows commanders and staffs to focus limited assets at the critical place and time on the battlefield.

Additionally, a quality event template gives the S2 a graphical product that describes in detail the coherent ECOA he has developed. With this template— and the enemy HVTs and COA narrative described above—S2s arrive at wargaming sessions and rehearsals better prepared to play the "thinking, uncooperative enemy."

Remember that your products must be disseminated in time to be of use to the subordinate staffs and commanders, and in a format they can use. Send out a tentative template when you have it, and then follow up with a more refined product. Do not make subordinate units wait for

the final product. Also, keep in mind that commanders normally execute from 1:50,000 scale maps, so make your products to that scale. COA sketches and graphic portrayals of enemy intentions have their uses. However, nothing beats an overlay scaled to the maps used by the supported unit for unequivocally laying out the S2's "read" of the enemy.

Staff Integration

It is important to base the entire staff's efforts on the S2-developed ECOAs. Staffs and subordinate commanders planning against a common view of the enemy are more likely to produce a coordinated plan to counter the enemy's probable actions than staffs planning without regard to enemy intentions. Actually, this is the reason that staffs even have intelligence officers. What we often fail to appreciate, however, is the invaluable input that staff members can provide to the S2 as he attempts to integrate the enemy's funtional areas into the overall ECOA. For example, the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Officer is the best source of advice on enemy ADA system emplacement. Similarly, the fire support officer (FSO) and mortar platoon leader can give good advice on how the enemy will employ indirect FS assets. Staff integration is the melding of other staff members' expertise into ECOA development.

One subject matter expert (SME) often overlooked is the battalion S2 noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). Infantry noncommissioned officers (NCOs), serving as battalion S2 NCOICs, have prepared some of the best templates we have seen from rotating teams and squads. For an infantry battalion fighting an enemy operating in teams, squads, and platoons, the senior NCO in this position is usually the best source of advice on how these small units will maneuver and fight. Most have

TASK:	Attack
PURPOSE:	Prevent U.S. force from establishing effective CSS and C₂ Operations.
METHOD:	Destroy convoy through mine and mortar attacks. Harass C₂ nodes through a combination of mortar and limited maneuver attacks.
END-STATE:	(Friendly)--No more than 25% CLF casualities and no more than one mortar tube lost. (Enemy)--One-quarter of all U.S. convoys suffer personnel casualties or loss of at least one vehicle. (Terrain)--CLF retains the ability to maneuver adjacent to Routes Beauregard and Bubba.

Figure 2. Enemy COA Narrative.

12 to 18 years of experience fighting in those types of units, and their analysis of possible enemy actions is usually correct. Similarly, the armor battalion S2 NCOICs can advise S2s about probable tank maneuver, and S2 NCOs from the field artillery battalion can often tell from a map or ground reconnaissance if a site is a viable position for enemy FS assets.

To get the best returns on the time invested by the other staff members, and to help them focus, S2s should provide each with an initial situation template, a set of HVTs, and a clear description of the enemy's task, purpose, method, and end-state. For example, the S2 might give fellow staff members a rough situation template or COA sketch showing a dispersed enemy, along with the ECOA narrative.

With this initial description of a likely ECOA, the other staff members can better advise the S2 on how the enemy commander would likely employ his functional assets. The S2 can then incorporate their advice into his final situation template.

Asset Useage

Many S2s and MI company commanders do not maximize the use of the available collection or electronic warfare delivery assets. To some extent, this stems from a simple failure to consider all possible collectors. Everyone, from MI company assets to truck drivers traveling along main supply routes, is a potential collector. S2s should consider all of them for possible collection taskings.

More importantly, often S2s and MI company commanders do not understand the capabilities and limitations of the collection systems in their brigades and those available from a higher headquarters. This can lead to negative results such as:

☐ Scout platoons tasked with too many named areas of interest (NAIs).

☐ The Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) teams given insufficient time to plan and execute sensor emplacement missions.

☐ Signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets positioned where they have little realistic chance of acquiring suspected emitters.

☐ Human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors not tasked with realistic specific orders and requests (SORs), and therefore not producing the quantity and quality of reporting they are capable of generating.

SMEs for each of these systems are only a telephone call away. The supporting MI battalions and companies have experienced NCOs and warrant officers who can educate S2s, MI company commanders, and maneuver battalion commanders and their staffs on the assets' capabilities and their limitations. These units and division G2 staffs have experts who can train S2s to tap into corps and national agency collection assets.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Rather than squander limited collection assets by covering a "measles sheet" of NAIs, S2s should focus on identifying those places on the battlefield that contain ECOA indicators, or which will likely yield information needed to answer the commander's PIR. Too often, S2s do not do this preliminary analysis. Instead, they assign NAIs to every templated enemy position and task subordinate units with monitoring these many NAIs. Consequently, collection assets are often over-tasked and subordinate units are hamstrung by requirements to cover a slew of higher headquarters' NAIs, when many of these NAIs serve no vital purpose.

To paraphrase doctrine, R&S plans exist to confirm or deny an ECOA, or to collect important information about the condition of the battlefield. This does not mean that every suspected enemy location must be covered by an NAI. Nor does it mean that R&S assets should be committed to answer questions about the battlefield that are not critical. For example, if a suspected forward observer location at grid WQ254678 is not an indicator of an ECOA, and if the commander does not intend to target it, then it is not a good candidate for an NAI. Similarly, if travel along a particular route is not critical to the unit's success, it would be a poor decision to use limited collection assets to determine that route's trafficability.

Another common shortcoming in R&S plans is that S2s fail to address the "who, what, where, when, and why" of each NAI. "Who" is the tasked unit. "What" is the unique number assigned to that NAI. "Where" is the single grid for point NAIs, a series of grids, or a center grid and radius for area NAIs. "When" incorporates the times the NAI should be observed, and the latest time the information is of value (LTIOV). "Why" equates to the tasked SOR for each NAI.

Doctrine does not specify how to express these bits of information. In fact, we see many successful methods used here at JRTC. However, the unmistakable trend is that without some sort of matrix laying out this information, units do not understand what they are expected to do at the assigned NAIs. Additionally, this matrix should be paired with an R&S overlay showing the location of all NAIs falling within the unit's AO. While these two products duplicate some information, experience shows that without both a matrix and an overlay, taskings are not as clearly understood.

Most units' biggest failure during execution of R&S plans is that they do not report on the

NAIs tasked to them. In part, this happens when R&S taskings are not emphasized in either the written or verbal operations order (OPORD). If R&S taskings are not included in Paragraph 3 of the OPORD, they are not likely to come to the attention of attached units. The sad truth is that if R&S taskings are just included in Annex B, then only the S2 section will likely see them. Placing R&S taskings in the "meat" of the OPORD highlights them for commanders and S3s, as well as S2s.

Successful execution of R&S plans will ultimately rely on the level of the commander's involvement in the R&S effort. Commanders who demand that R&S plans contain the same detail as all other combat missions receive better R&S plans from their staffs. Likewise, commanders who demand compliance with R&S taskings usually obtain better results. When commanders are not involved, subordinate units generally do not execute R&S taskings as well, and the commander does not get the enemy information he needs.

Pattern Analysis

Pattern analysis is the key to getting inside the enemy's decision cycle, especially when fighting a foe for whom the S2 has a limited database. Good collection of combat information drives pattern analysis. The basic pattern analysis tool, the incident overlay, records where activities have occurred on the battlefield. A successful technique used by many S2 sections and ACTs is to employ color-coded symbols, stickers, or flags to indicate the types of activity occurring at a given location. For instance, all ambushes might be colored blue, while all sniper attacks might be colored red. This simple technique graphically depicts what types of activities have occurred and where they took place. By saving multiple event overlays, analysts can place these over one another to do long-term

analysis of trends in areas of intense enemy activity.

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, and **FM 34-7, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations**, both explain in detail how to use a number of tools which supplement the simple technique described above by tying in the element of time. These techniques add valuable depth to intelligence analysis by allowing S2s to tell commanders and staffs the time the enemy is likely to strike, as well as where they are likely to act. Again, the combination of these pattern analysis techniques helps to give a more complete picture of likely enemy actions. This, in turn, helps S2s to focus future operations based on detailed projections of probable ECOAs.

Intelligence Support to Targeting

Intelligence drives successful targeting efforts. A detailed discussion of targeting would require a separate article, but a crucial point for S2s, and ACTs in particular, to keep in mind is that targeting focuses on the future. To that end, we recommend that S2s bring a series of products to targeting meetings which highlight significant recent events, and lay out how the enemy will appear during the period of the fight that the targeting meeting addresses. These products include the—

☐ Current situation template and incident overlay to show the enemy's recent and present activities.

☐ Current HVTs and those for the targeting period.

☐ Current battle damage assessment, highlighting any changes to the enemy's capabilities.

☐ Current commander's PIR, highlighting any answered PIR since the last targeting meeting and the recommended changes to the PIR.

☐ Status of the current R&S plan, highlighting important reports and the remaining intelligence gaps, and the recommended changes to the R&S plan.

☐ Status of R&S assets now, and their projected status during the targeting period.

☐ Situation and event templates detailing probable ECOAs during the targeting period.

Targeting meetings should result in a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to subordinate units. That FRAGO should include the S2's updated situation and event templates, any changes to the commander's PIR, and the updated R&S plan. These products must be disseminated with the FRAGO. If not, they may arrive too late to be of use to subordinate commanders as they plan their future operations.

Conclusion

This article laid out a series of focus items to help intelligence teams prepare for the JRTC, as well as for real-world deployments. While these recommendations are not all-inclusive, they incorporate the most prominent shortcomings that the JRTC intelligence O/Cs frequently see. I hope that these comments will guide S2s and MI company commanders as they put together future intelligence training plans.

Captain Barefoot is the Task Force S2 O/C at JRTC. His previous assignments include service as a Counterintelligence Officer at the 25th Infantry Division (Light); Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade, 25th ID; S2, 1-21 Infantry, 25th ID; Executive Officer and Fire Direction Officer, C Battery, 2-320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); and Fire Support Officer in the 3-327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT). CPT Barefoot has a bachelor of arts degree in English from Lawrence University and earned a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence through the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program at the National Military Defense Intelligence College. Readers can contact the author via E-mail at barefows@polk-emh2.army.mil and telephonically at (318) 531-0163 or DSN 863-0163.

PROPONENT NOTES

Warrant Officer Recruiting Update

Several recent changes to military intelligence warrant officer recruiting have been implemented. The **Standard Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions**, is no longer required. A memorandum from your unit's S2 or Special Security Officer verifying clearance, access level, and the date and type of investigation that awarded the clearance is the only required document. If your special background investigation or single-scope background investigation is more than five years old, the memo must specify the date when your periodic reinvestigation was submitted. All MI military occupational specialties (MOSs) require a current Top Secret clearance with sensitive compartmented information (SCI) access, except MOS 351E, which only requires a Secret clearance.

A new, highly encouraged, but optional prerequisite is a letter of recommendation from a senior warrant officer in the career field for which you are applying. This is not mandatory since many noncommissioned officers (NCOs) do not work for warrant officers who could write the letter. This letter should be from a warrant officer who has direct knowledge of the applicant's ability to perform in his or her MOS. The only other letters needed for the application are the endorsements of the company and battalion commanders.

We are now recruiting applicants for MOSs 351E, Interrogation Technician, and 352G, Voice Intercept Technician, by language. A Defense Language Proficiency Test score report from the last 12 months that verifies a 2/2 language capability is required. Our greatest need is for Korean and Arabic speakers.

Currently, accessions are closed for Spanish and German

linguists in those 2 MOSs. If you are a Spanish or German speaker and would like to apply, you must have a Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) score in excess of 115 and include a memorandum in your application stating that you would be willing to be retrained in a Category IV language upon accession. If you are selected, you will go to the Defense Language Institute for Korean or Arabic training prior to your initial assignment as a warrant officer. None of the other MI warrant officer MOSs require a language proficiency.

If you have any specific questions on MI warrant officer accessions, please get in touch with the warrant officer point of contact in the Office of the Chief, Military Intelligence; CW5 Rex Williams, Warrant Officer Professional Development Manager by E-mail at williamsx@huachuca-emh1.army.mil or by phone at (520) 533-1183 or DSN 821-1183.

MI CORPS HALL OF FAME

Specialist Five Gerald L. Beatson

MI Hall of Fame (HOF) Inductee: 1989

SP5 Gerald Beatson, then a counterintelligence corps (CIC) agent assigned to the U.S. Army Naples detachment, transferred to the MI ALSOS task force on 27 December 1943. (ALSOS was the code name for the mission. It was based on the Greek word for "Grove," the name of one of the principals in developing the special task force.) The ALSOS mission, one of the most

important intelligence missions during World War II, was to determine whether the Germans had the capability to engineer an atomic bomb. There were only twenty or so handpicked CIC agents assigned to the mission.

From his first ALSOS operation at the Anzio beachhead on 9 February 1943, throughout his service, and until the end of hostilities, Agent Beatson exhibited outstanding professionalism, personal courage, and calmness under enemy fire. In the many subsequent, critical ALSOS operations in which he played a

part, his operational know-how and positive leadership were factors in the successful accomplishment of his volunteer or assigned missions.

These qualities were clearly demonstrated in operations such as that on the Albert Canal in Belgium. ALSOS' mission was to locate and recover critically needed uranium ore while disregarding sporadic enemy fire. SP5 Beatson was involved in every subsequent ALSOS operation, including the advance under fire into the Alpine community of Urfeldt. At Urfeldt, they

captured Professor Heisenberg, the leading German atomic scientist and ALSOS' number one target. In a final ALSOS operation, SP5 Beatson led a detachment of eight men to an advance point ahead of friendly troops to intercept and stall the advancing Soviet elements. His detachment thus gave ALSOS time to recover the International Radium Standards located in Weida, Germany, a community that was to be part of the zone of Soviet occupation.

Master Sergeant Travis C. Bunn

MI HOF Inductee: 1992

MSG Bunn began his Army career in 1958 with the 320th U.S. Army Security Agency (ASA) Battalion in Bad Aibling, Germany. When the ASA joined the counterinsurgency team in 1961, he was among the first volunteers to support the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) (Airborne). MSG Bunn advised and instructed Special Forces (SF) teams in the application of security and counterintelligence techniques for clandestine, covert, and overt operations, and provided ASA support for SF operations. In 1963, he became an instructor at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Two years later, he became the noncommissioned officer in

charge (NCOIC), ASA Special Operations Detachment (SOD),

Operations and Training in Panama. While there, MSG Bunn planned, organized, and supervised the training and actions of special operations teams involved in ASA and SF operations. He also served as an instructor for both U.S. and Latin American forces at the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

While in Panama, MSG Bunn decided to tackle two complicated missions. The first was an effort to convince the SF teams to stop transmitting radio signals from within their base camps. The second mission was to find a way to make a "man packable" direction-finding (DF) set. He solved these problems in reverse order. He improvised by using a PRC-6 homing device antenna, a variable tuning coil attached to an AN/GRC-109 receiver, a broomstick with a nail driven in the bottom, and various other miscellaneous items to make the world's first "man packable" radio DF set. MSG Bunn and his team used this system against the 8th SF teams in the jungles of Panama and succeeded in surprising two of the teams in their base camp. Through his perseverance and ingenuity, he proved his point and accomplished his goal: deployed teams no longer transmitted from within base camps. This life-saving operations security measure became a standard procedure for all teams in the group.

MSG Bunn was assigned to the Republic of Vietnam in 1967 as an SF/ASA team leader with the 403d SOD, 5th Special Forces Group (SFG). There he recruited, trained, and led a company of hill tribesmen in combat operations in the central highlands of Vietnam, and supervised and controlled a team of 20 soldiers in ASA and SF operations.

Starting in 1969, MSG Bunn served at the ASA Field Station at Herozenaurach, in then-West Germany. As the Morse collection NCOIC, he was instrumen-

tal in increasing productivity of Morse collection operations to a level that exceeded national standards. When their operations were consolidated at Augsburg, Germany, MSG Bunn personally ensured continuity of operations and completed the move without a loss in productivity. In 1974, he became the Acting Sergeant Major of the 402d SOD, 10th SFG, where he served with distinction. In July 1977, he returned to Panama as the Acting Sergeant Major of the ASA Southern Command. MSG Bunn retired in 1977 after 20 years of service characterized by creativeness, initiative, and selfless devotion to duty.

Command Sergeant Major Clifford L. Charron

MI HOF Inductee: 1989

CSM Charron, a soldier's soldier, served in combat in the European Theater with the 66th Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Division from 1943 to 1945. Following several stateside assignments, he was assigned to the 24th Infantry Division in Japan in June 1949. He served with the division in combat in Korea until he was transferred to the Joint Military Advisory Group, Japan in September 1950. He served there until the end of the Korean War.

He later switched from combat arms to military intelligence,

where he served in a variety of key intelligence assignments in Europe and the United States. His concern for the morale and esprit de corps of his soldiers was manifested in his involvement in two major projects that still endure today. Sergeant Major Charron was instrumental in the founding of the Army Security Agency (ASA) Benefit Association, which provides funds to families of ASA members killed in the line of duty and education benefits to their survivors. He was also a key figure in the planning, design, and construction of the permanent memorial honoring ASA noncommissioned officers killed in action; it is located at the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He concluded his career as the first Command Sergeant Major of the U.S. Army Security Agency.

Private Sarah Emma Edmonds (Deceased)

MI HOF Inductee: 1988

Sarah Edmonds, born in December 1841 in Canada, fled New Brunswick in 1856 to shun an arranged marriage. She disguised herself as a man, took the name of Franklin Thompson, and was able to earn a living as a Bible salesman in Michigan. In 1861, still disguised as Thompson, Edmonds attempted to enlist in the Michigan Infantry but failed to meet the height requirement.

In May of the same year, continuing the disguise, Edmonds successfully enlisted in the 2d Michigan Infantry. "PVT Thompson" was sent as a field nurse assigned to assist the chaplain and his wife. She saw service at both Battles of Bull Run, the Peninsula Campaign, Antietam, and Fredericksburg.

The death of a childhood friend (who never knew of her true identity) led her to volunteer for duty as a spy. Allegedly, General McClellan personally interviewed her for the job. She was tested on the knowledge of firearms, given a phrenological examination[1], and sworn into the secret service. "PVT Thompson" was able to break down the barriers not only of gender but of race as well. Using silver nitrate to disguise her skin color, she was able to retrieve vital information from both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line. She claimed to have performed eleven secret missions during the Civil War.

In 1863, shortly after her regiment moved into Kentucky, "PVT Thompson" contracted malaria and was forced to desert to

avoid being exposed as a woman and expelled from the Army. Upon her return to Cairo, Illinois, she assumed the identity and role of a female nurse. She remained in the service, serving at Harper's Ferry with the Christian Commission. It was not until 1884 that Sarah Edmonds publicly revealed her true identity at a regimental reunion of the 2d Michigan Infantry. In 1886, Congress awarded her a pension and dropped the bad conduct discharge for desertion. She was then admitted to the Grand Army of the Republic and remains its only female member.

Private First Class Stanley W. Kapp (Deceased)

MI HOF Inductee: 1988

Stanley Kapp was born in Brooklyn, New York, circa 1921, to Jewish immigrants from Poland. In 1942, PFC Kapp was sent as a signals intercept technician to The Philippines. Shortly after The Philippines fell, he and several other signals intelligence operators eluded the Japanese

for six months.

Despite the fact the soldiers had not been paid, they were able to purchase a makeshift boat with money PFC Kapp had saved, and set sail for Australia. One of his peers described PFC Kapp as "*the Robinson Crusoe of the crew, someone to be counted on, and the last one who would develop any semblance of a yellow streak.*" Currents and winds forced them to the Indonesian islands. After the local Chinese residents cared for them for a short time, the Japanese learned of the presence of the Americans and took them into captivity.

The hardships of the voyage and the difficult conditions of exposure, disease, and starvation they experienced at Camp Tantoey proved to be fatal for Kapp. He died in captivity in the Dutch East Indies in 1944 while awaiting transportation and repatriation. Forty-one years later, a barracks building in Hawaii was

dedicated in his honor for his contributions in the face of enemy resistance and for his distinguished service. As a junior, inexperienced enlisted soldier, PFC Kapp displayed initiative and valor far beyond his years. His effort to save his fellow soldiers is a model for us all.

Specialist Five
Edward F. Minnock

MI HOF Inductee: 1990

SP5 Edward Minnock enlisted in the Army in September of 1966 and deployed to Vietnam as a member of the 404th Radio Research Detachment, attached to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). As a private, he was the acting Operations Sergeant

for the 404th, a position normally held by a sergeant first class.

On 27 March 1968, he began to notice that the incoming information pointed to an enemy attack on Tuy Hoa City within the next ten days. He directed his soldiers to concentrate their efforts on the forthcoming operation. Within five days, Private Minnock had produced a comprehensive tactical analysis and prediction of how and when the enemy would attack. Private Minnock briefed the brigade and subordinate commanders, as well as the commander of a Korean regiment and his American advisor. In order to gain credibility with the Korean commander,

Private Minnock impersonated a captain because he believed that the Korean officer would not listen to an enlisted man.

Private Minnock accurately predicted which units comprised the enemy force, their size, the time of the attack, the routes of advance and withdrawal, and the primary targets of the assault. The targets included two important bridges, the city prison, the American airfield, and a South Vietnamese artillery battalion located in the city. Private Minnock's information resulted in the postponement of an offensive operation by the Korean regiment, allowing them to act as a reserve during the enemy attack, and the repositioning of other key forces. He also accurately predicted the new location of the 5th North Vietnamese Army Division Headquarters. He then coordinated and directed the bombing of the headquarters by two 175-millimeter artillery shells and eight 500-pound bombs, thus seriously degrading the enemy's command and control capability. Subsequent intelligence gathered during and after the battle confirmed the startling accuracy of Private Minnock's predictions.

As a direct result of his efforts, the enemy was soundly defeated with minimal friendly casualties. His truly remarkable achievement is a textbook example of the difference that can be made in the outcome of a combat action by the initiative of one individual soldier. Private Minnock's contributions are doubly impressive given his relative age and inexperience. For his actions, Private Minnock was decorated with the Legion of Merit, the only private ever to hold that honor.

MSG John R. Wilson
(Deceased)

MI HOF Inductee: 1990

John Wilson first entered the Army in February 1942. During

World War II, he served in the Asiatic Pacific Theater, attaining the rank of major. He was discharged in 1947, and, a short time thereafter, enlisted in the Army as a master sergeant. Sergeant Wilson was an imposing

figure and was known throughout his career as one who seized the initiative.

MSG Wilson, assigned to the 25th Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment, 27th Infantry ("The Wolfhounds"), 25th Infantry Division, led a patrol of 30 South Korean police and interpreters to Pangso-ri, Korea, on 13 October 1950 to surprise an enemy guerrilla force before it reached the village. Upon reaching the village and finding it already occupied by the enemy, MSG Wilson first ordered his men to surround it, then proceeded into the village accompanied by four South Korean police officers. When a group of the enemy troops occupying a house refused to surrender and opened fire, Sergeant Wilson personally led a successful attack on the hostile position. Although a sniper killed him during the action, his patrol dispersed the enemy unit and captured 21 of its members.

A fellow member of MSG Wilson's CIC team later wrote, "*John earned many Silver Stars, which he never received, and was one of those who the Corps could truly say was a hero in his*

own right." John did much to enhance the position of the Counterintelligence Corps within a military community which never really understood the function and purpose of the intelligence agents being assigned to them. The team member continued, saying that MSG Wilson was very instrumental in helping (former 27th Infantry commander) General John Michaelis become aware of the importance of the counterintelligence team in combat. *"So much, in fact, that several times when attempts were made to withdraw us to division headquarters, General Michaelis would raise all kinds of hell and went as far as to say, and I* quote him, 'How can I fight a damn war without counterintelligence people around me?'"

Endnote

1. Phrenology was a popular theory of the time. It maintained that the configuration of a person's skull indicated certain mental faculties and character traits.

QUICK TIPS

Safe Tactical Layout of Cable and Wire

by First Sergeant Timothy P. Carroll, Jr.

With the significant increase of digital technology throughout our force, there is a commensurate increase in the amount of cable and wire that must be run to connect all of these devices. Although these wires can be laid out safely in a static environment, laying them out in a highly mobile field environment can be a serious safety challenge. Many tactical operation centers now have several miles of cables and wires strung under, around, and over them. The following tenets will help you to lay this wire safely in a highly mobile field environment like a division Analysis and Control Element (ACE):

☐ Ensure all wires follow vehicle lines in parallel.

☐ Cross wires between vehicles at a common point; fewer crossing points equals increased safety. It never hurts to place the wires in a shallow trench or cover them with a tarp.

☐ Secure wires at crossing points to a stake driven into the ground.

☐ Keep wire on the ground whenever possible. If wire must go above a site, it should stay on top of vehicles wherever possible and only cross in areas where few soldiers travel.

First Sergeant Carroll is at the NCO Academy, Fort Huachuca, AZ. His telephone number is (520) 533-4219, DSN 821-4219, or E-mail him at carrollt@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

NCOER Writing Tips

by Sergeant First Class Daniel D. Knippel

When composing an NCO Evaluation Report (NCOER), use **AR 611-201, Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties** (found in Update 12-6), to properly fill out Blocks IIIa ("PRINCIPAL DUTY TITLE") and Vb ("List 3 positions in which the rated NCO could best serve..."). These two entries are important in determining the level at which your soldier served and will serve in the future. The Department of the Army's centralized promotion boards are more likely to give your soldier due credit for a position if it is a bonafide title, rather than one which is not common or supported by doctrine.

I have seen many NCOERs, and I have noticed many similar bullets under responsibility and accountability. These bullets generally refer to a dollar amount for equipment for which the rated NCO is signed. Do not forget that this block encompasses other areas including—

☐ Care and maintenance of equipment and facilities.

☐ Soldier and equipment safety.

☐ Encouraging soldiers to learn and grow.

☐ Responsibility for good and bad, right and wrong.

Details, facts, and impact make the best bullets. Bullets should answer questions like—

☐ What did the NCO do? (rescued some people).

☐ How many/much? (rescued five people).

☐ What was the end result? (rescued five people from a burning building, saving their lives).

Sergeant First Class Knippel is also at the NCO Academy. He is the Chief Instructor, BNCOC, at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Call him at (520) 533-4221, DSN 821-4221, or E-mail knippeld@huachuca-emh1.army.mil.

LETTERS

We put 1LT Zeytoonian's recommendation for the addition of a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements Management Office at Fort Eustis, Virginia. Their response: U.S. Army policy was that there would be only one command and control vehicle per platoon. That vehicle is already on the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). We have raised this issue several times over recent years with TRADOC and Department of the Army (DA), but to no avail. We need your commanders to raise this issue formally at the Commander in Chief and DA levels.

The AN/PRD-12 is a component of the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2. It is not intended to be used separately, although the Commander has the latitude to do so. In previous TRQ-32 configurations, the AN/TRQ-30/PRD-10 and 11 were used as a temporary short-range direction-finding system for special situations and to give a surge capability. They were not given separate crews. This was an agreed upon position by field units, TRADOC, and DA.

1LT Zeytoonian's comments on site security are right on the mark. The platoon leader and/or commander has the responsibility to coordinate with the supported unit to integrate defense plans. The supported commander will select the best and most effective way to defend his area of responsibility.

Each AN/TLQ-17 team is authorized an AN/VRC-47 (which modernizes to a VRC-89A). Our belief is that this configuration provides sufficient communications for the electronic attack team.

We welcome added comments on this subject. Our bottom line is always on providing the best support possible to our fielded units. This, however, is often a constant trade-off between available resources and an optimum organization. We are doing the best we can within constraints imposed by DA. We desperately need our Division and Corps commanders to come on-line with official correspondence to your major Army commands and DA if we are to be successful in the changes highlighted in this article.

**Michael W. Powell
(Technical Director, Combat Developments)**

Fort Huachuca, Arizona

To the Editor:

What a pleasure it was to read Captain Courtney's "The Successful Lieutenant" in the April-June 1997 issue of *MIPB*.

I found that CPT Courtney's article hit the nail squarely on the head on each point he made. As an old retired First Sergeant (U.S. Army Security Agency, 1947-1967), I appreciated the real substance of each of his discussions. To use an old cliche, "he is wise beyond his years." This was the best read for me since I read Colin Powell's biography, a fine book.

I soldiered under some exceptional commanders, and the Captain measures up to them all. I would bet that the NCOs who serve or have served in his command assignments having nothing but the utmost respect for him.

This article is a ready-made lesson plan for any leadership course, be it for officers or NCOs.

I would like to make a suggestion on the *MPIB* format: it is a bit too tight. A little white space would make reading somewhat easier.

**First Sergeant Jim Clinton
(USA, Retired)**

Old Bethpage, New York

ELDN

with the understanding that the SGM council member will get together with his or her commander. This is important because the SGMs must know their commanders' intent and have their support on the issue so that the right decisions are made when the council meets.

Although there will be some discussion, the council will determine at the briefing whether further assessment is needed; whether an issue has been resolved; or whether it will enter the LDSS because the issue cannot be resolved at council level. The issues that enter the LDSS are the issues that the council strongly recommends. However, because they involve dollars or human resources, they must go to the CSA for approval.

To ensure the ELDN "loop" is closed, the individual who originally brought up the issue is notified when the assessment and resolution of the issue is completed. The information is also posted on the ELDN webpage. We think that is a very important piece—to "come to closure."

The beauty of the ELDN is that it eliminates the redundancy of issues being raised repeatedly at meetings and conferences without resolution, and establishes a one-source list of all issues and their current disposition. Perhaps most importantly, according to the spokesperson, *"We spend the dime and save the dollar by allowing NCOs the opportunity to resolve issues quicker at the lowest level."*

PROFESSIONAL READER

Imagine your country embroiled in a conflict that many analysts said would drag on for years, was being fought halfway around the world, wasn't all that popular at home, and you probably couldn't win. Suppose too that you had a sure-fire plan that would quietly end the war, with your side winning. Naturally such a plan might save millions of lives and countless millions of dollars. Imagine also being in a position to present that plan to three different U.S. presidents. Now imagine your plan being rejected by all three. Such was the fate of Mr. Norborne Robinson, his **Vietnam Victory Option,** and the outcome of the Vietnam War.

Mr. Robinson, as an advisor to the decisionmakers of the time, provides a firsthand account of, and insight into, the politics leading up to and throughout the Vietnam War, and the concerns of the US Presidents making the momentous choices of those times.

In Part One, the prologue of his book, Mr. Robinson sketches earlier events that both set the stage for the war and heavily influenced the way it was fought. Prior experiences and different (often conflicting) conclusions drawn from them were important considerations in the Washington decisionmaking arena.

Part Two, Combat, details the policies of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, and the controversial military strategies subordinate to them. Part Two outlines the proposed victory option combat scenario, which was basically as follows: The food production for the bulk of the population of North Vietnam depended on a series of flood control and crop water earthen dikes on the Red River. The author proposed that by bombing the agricultural dike system, the U.S. could effectively destroy North Vietnam's food production, thus destroying confidence in the Government of North Vietnam. To feed a starving population, the failed Hanoi Government would have to sue for peace. To avoid the horror of famine, the Republic of South Vietnam could then provide food which the U.S. would deliver.

The military mind must raise the question, "Why didn't the U.S. exercise such an option in Vietnam?" The answer was simple. The U.S., facing three Communist sectors in the Far East, Korea, Indochina, and Formosa, did not want a confrontation with China and feared its intervention, thus a number of Vietnam "victory" options were never exercised. Among them was the bombing of the Red River dikes.

Mr. Robinson provides a superb short course in the post-World War II and Vietnam-era political climate and three excellent additional thoughts for the reader to keep in mind. First, he reminds us that Communist worldwide expansion was **very** real. Second, Communism was halted in Korea and delayed for at least ten years in Indochina. (He postulates that resolve on the part of the U.S., and the delay in Indochina, were enough to cause Communism to loose momentum, and eventually fail elsewhere.) Third, the military is simply the strong right arm of the body politick. It does not have the ability to determine when, where, how, or to what extent it may or may not be used; neither is there an obligation for explanation. This last item will ever be a bitter pill for the military professional, particularly when there are options for victory which go unused.

This text provides insight into the political dynamics that led to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and should be studied by politicians, historians, and military professionals both for historical clarity and for applicable lessons for the future. We are fortunate for Mr. Robinson's personal perspective.

Chief Warrant Officer Five
Richard E. Cameron (USA, Retired)
Albuquerque, New Mexico

The author takes the reader very skillfully through the hard-fought combat campaigns of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) in the northern regions of South Vietnam. The text has been engineered to keep the interest of the reader, unlike other so-called historical accounts of modern combat.

As the author has obviously indicated by the bibliography, he has done extensive research into the operational activities of USMC. This is reflected in the almost day-to-day story of the brutal and sometimes heroic path that the Corps took as it struck blow after blow on the forces of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). It becomes clear that the USMC inflicted extremely heavy casualties on the communist elements; that is, if the "body count" can be relied upon.

The heroic actions of many of the combatants are described in some detail, which lends authenticity to the unfolding story. Real names and activities which resulted in the awarding of the Navy Cross, and even the Congressional Medal of Honor, give glimpses of the human side of war.

The book does an excellent job in relaying to the reader the tension that existed between the Marine Corps combat leaders and the Army (MACV) General staff. The political aspects of the war overshadow much of what was accomplished by the hardnosed Marines. The constant relinquishing of seized territory back to the invading NVA, especially in the Que Son Valley, is indicative of the situation encountered by the Marines, who had to feel frustrated each time they had to retake the same property.

This history of the Vietnam War, from the first advisors in 1965 to the evacuation of the key political holdings in DaNang and Saigon in 1975, was easy to read, for the author has a literary gift which allows him to impart all the cold, hard facts in a manner which draws the reader into the action.

I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in military history. It would make an excellent reference for persons doing research into the real guts of the war. I congratulate the author on an excellent job.

William F. Ivory
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

The Undetected Enemy, John Nordell's recent book on Dien Bien Phu, breaks new ground on why the French risked so much at Dien Bien Phu. With thorough research, Nordell brings out fresh ideas on why the French chose such a remote and inaccessible region for a major operation. His book is well documented. He uses hundreds of primary sources, including recently declassified documents, press releases, and war memoirs to back up his points. Unlike Dien Bien Phu's other well-established histories, Bernard Fall's **Hell is a Very Small Place** and Jules Roy's **Dien Bien Phu,** Nordell does not focus on how the battle unfolded and its subsequent outcome. Rather, he focuses on why it was fought.

Nordell dispels two primary areas of conventional wisdom. First, that the French wanted Dien Bien Phu to be a fixed battle site like the entrenched camp at Na San. In **The Undetected Enemy,** Nordell also demonstrates a significant intelligence failure. Senior French commanders seriously underestimated the size of enemy forces committed against Dien Bien Phu. These two errors are directly attributable to the French defeat.

Instead of a fixed defensive battle, Nordell illustrates how the French selected Dien Bien Phu as a launch site for mobile, offensive operations. The post was "directed to use half its force" for offensive operations. The French choice for the Dien Bien Phu's commander confirms the mobile nature envisioned for Dien Bien Phu. General Cogny, commander of ground forces in North Vietnam, stated, "I'm thinking of (COL) Castries. A cavalryman would be ideal at

Dien Bien Phu, where the situation will be mobile." Later, when trying to persuade COL Castries to accept the job, Cogny again stated, "Dien Bien Phu must be an offensive base."

However, even a quick terrain analysis shows Dien Bien Phu situated in an extremely mountainous region. The proposed battlefield was crossed by only a handful of trails, a mule path, and one paved road, Route 41, that was held by the Vietminh along its entire span. However, French planners did not consider this; rather, they planned for seizing the initiative and not remaining in defensive positions. The blunder in terrain selection was further compounded by the underestimation of enemy strength.

Nordell also contends the popular belief that French intelligence assets accurately identified Vietminh strength and intentions. He describes the concern among both French and American officials on the inability of French intelligence to produce accurate intelligence on the size of the Vietminh troop movement. This point is most clearly portrayed with the French dereliction in identifying the magnitude of the threat.

The initial intelligence estimate had one to one-and-a-half divisions committed against Dien Bien Phu, not the corps-sized unit of 5 to 6 divisions that eventually assaulted the base. The French decision to occupy and then stay at Dien Bien Phu was based on this faulty intelligence. Since reinforcements were not available, the commitment of a relatively small force deep inside enemy-held territory proved disastrous.

Even when it became apparent that the enemy would attack in much larger force, General Navarre, French Indochina commander in chief, was reluctant to revise his initial estimate, and merely conceded that Dien Bien Phu could be attacked by more important forces than those initially envisaged. This refusal to accept the seriousness of the threat contributed directly to the French loss.

Nordell, through careful research, documents these premises. The reference list is exhaustive and complete. However, I found myself constantly flipping from the text to the reference to get the full picture. Nordell's book is informative, easy to read, and provides new aspects of a controversial battle. His emphasis on intelligence and the role it played in the outcome makes this an ideal book for students of the intelligence art and how it influences war.

Captain Bruce Niedrauer
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

Secret Army, Secret War: Washington's Tragic Spy Operation in North Vietnam by Sedgwick Tourison (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1995), 389 pages, $31.95 hardcover. ISBN:1-55750-818-6

The author is a veteran of U.S. Army intelligence in Southeast Asia. His service took him to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. He later worked for the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), focusing on prisoner of war (POW) and missing in action affairs. It is probably in this assignment and his Southeast Asian experiences that his interest developed on the many incursions into North Vietnam and the consequences for the personnel captured in these operations.

Secret Army, Secret War shows Tourison's interest in and in-depth knowledge of his past. The book is an examination of the formalization of these intelligence penetration operations and the personal outcomes for the operatives captured in North Vietnam and Laos. It centers on what is known overall as OP34A, although it encompasses other operations as well. Most historians refer to the entire penetration activity as OP34A.

The inception of intelligence missions into the North was fathered by the Central Intelligence Agency, primarily under William Colby when he was Station Chief in Saigon. The operation aimed at penetrating through two specific mediums—the air and water. Conceived along the lines of the World War II's Office of Strategic Services (OSS) teams, groups operating behind the lines was an attractive idea. Past penetration operations in Europe, in Korea during the Korean War, and others into China had failed; however, the hopes here were that these would be successful. Small, well-trained groups or teams were either dropped into the North by air, sometimes using Taiwanese aircrews, or were delivered along the extensive North Vietnamese coastline. The purpose was to acquire information about the North's activities and to develop the network's capable of disrupting the North's covert operations and later main drives into the South.

The program was a massive failure. Station Chief Colby came to the conclusion that these groups were being quickly captured by the internal security forces in the North and the information that was coming through was "disinformation" originating from Communist sources who were now controlling the teams. There were suspicions of leaks and the growing belief in the quality of counterintelligence in the North as being supreme in the game to gather intelligence on the ground. When the OP34A was taken over by the Department of Defense (DOD), Station Chief Colby told Secretary Robert McNamara that the program was not working and the groups had been easily "rolled up" by the North. The information that was received was very questionable. Still, DOD continued until variations on OP34A showed the futility of it all. The prisons were becoming full of the operatives.

The North kept the fact that it was holding these POWs from the Americans, who never acknowledged the fact that operations in the North had been compromised. Even after the North's entry into Saigon, few knew of the continued imprisonment. Families, if told anything at all, were told their men had probably died. The American press has picked up this aspect of death notification and then highlighted the family discovering a loved one still alive. The press condemned DOD for the problem and spared the North any blame.

Tourison has done an excellent job. The book covers the high-level activity of conception and development, the insertion, the teams, and their fates. The style keeps one's attention and the story, while sad, is worth discovering.

Peter Charles Unsinger
San Jose State University, California

Easy Target: The Long Strange Trip Of A Scout Pilot In Vietnam by Tom Smith (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996), 267 pages, $24.95

The author has a very good approach in the telling of his personal experiences in a combat situation in Vietnam. The book cannot in any way be categorized as a history of the war, but should be read by persons interested in the occurrences of the times (1969-1970).

The book is an excellent portrayal of the tour of duty of a combat pilot. From his pre-Army days in a small town through his discharge and return to his home, the book describes the mind-set of the average soldier in Vietnam. He tells of his fears, and how they are overcome. The personal experiences of this soldier who was anti-war, yet performed his duties admirably amid a variety of obstacles, is the story of most soldiers who have spent time in a combat zone.

The story presents characters who are an important part of the author's tour of duty. His description of the individuals in the unit is something with which other combat veterans can identify. This young pilot experiences flying in a dangerous aspect of combat, that of trying to draw out the enemy and having them engage him in a firefight. His writing style is that of an experienced, professional writer, which made reading the book very easy.

I recommend this book for any military person interested in seeing what a combat situation is like— not just aviation types, but anybody who might share in such an experience.

William F. Ivory
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

The Role of the NCO

cohesion, esprit, and, ultimately, victory. NCOs are the standard bearers for Army values. They must instill them in their soldiers, enforce them without exception, and live by these values themselves.

Conclusion

The MI NCO is faced with an unprecedented set of challenges. Our NCO Corps will get smaller. We will operate with fewer NCOs who must have to master a greater range of tasks that will be executed by a more junior force.

The extended virtual environment will require our NCOs to lead, manage, support, and mentor soldiers operationally deployed across the globe. Soldier skills trained on a daily basis will translate into mission accomplishment and lives saved. The backbone of readiness and training is our NCO Corps. Noncommissioned officers must excel at their jobs if Army MI is to succeed.

Lieutenant General Kennedy has served in her current position as the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence since March 1997. General Kennedy has held a variety of command and staff positions throughout her career. Her key assignments include: Commander, 3d Operations Battalion, U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg; Commander, San Antonio Recruiting Battalion, U.S. Army Recruiting Command; and Commander, 703d Military Intelligence Brigade, Field Station Kunia. She has served as Operations Officer, U.S. Army Field Station Augsburg; Staff Officer, Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; Director of Intelligence, G2, Forces Command; and as the Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca and Assistant Commandant, U.S. Army Intelligence School. General Kennedy was commissioned a second lieutenant in June 1969 through the Women's Army Corps and received a bachelor of arts degree in Philosophy from Southwestern University in Memphis. Readers can contact the DCSINT telephonically at (703) (703) 695-2968 and DSN DSN 225-2968 and via E-mail at donald.torrence@hqda.army.mil.

75th Ranger

are trained both physically and mentally to assume this responsibility. The intelligence NCO must provide the best available intelligence to the user, and it must be in a format that is clear, concise, and to the point. Most importantly, it must fit the requirements of the combat commander's mission. Good ground tactical intelligence will win our future battles. It is our job as MI NCOs at the tactical level to ensure that we never fail.

Endnote

1. Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the Intelligence Estimate are "Enemy Situation," "Enemy Capabilities," and "Conclusions," respectively.

Sergeant First Class Blaess is currently assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment as the MID Senior Intelligence Sergeant. His previous assignments include S2 NCO in Charge for the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii; Intelligence Analyst, 2d Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington; and two separate assignments as an Intelligence Analyst, 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Lewis. Readers can contact him via E-mail at blaessj@abenningb.soc.mil.

Training Linguists

better linguist in terms of experience, but one year is not a very long time when several month-long deployments are factored into the equation. This limits the amount of expertise one can expect from these primarily lower ranking soldiers, but much more time is available for training and immersion opportunities.

Conclusion

Language training is a challenge for most MI units in the Army. The 311th MI Battalion has placed significant emphasis on seeking and funding training for its linguists. As their performance in recent operations shows, our linguists use their talents to excel in their jobs and bring accolades to their home units. Our training program and new facility should ensure that the linguists of the 311th MI Battalion will continue to serve the needs of the 101st well.

Sergeant First Class Robertson has transferred to Europe. He was most recently the language manager for the 311th MI Battalion, and worked in the Analysis and Control Element before that. SFC Robertson also served nearly a year in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Easter

3. Andrade, 62.

4. Major General Frederick J. Kroesen, **Quang Tri: The Lost Province** (U.S. Army War College document, 16 Jan 74).

5. Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, **Intelligence** (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, date unknown), 155.

6. Andrade, 25.

7. Message from: Kroesen to General Creighton Abrams, Subject: Daily Commander's Evaluation, 033335Z 27APR72.

Mr. Bob Baker graduated with the first 96B class from Fort Huachuca in 1971. He was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 525th MI Group, headquartered in Da Nang, Vietnam. His further assignments included positions at Fort Bliss, Texas; two tours with the European Defense Analysis Center (EUDAC) at Vaihingen, Germany; and the 513th MI Group, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Mr. Baker has a bachelor of science degree in Government from the University of Maryland. He is currently the Chief Threat Analyst for Northrop Grumman Corporation. Readers may contact him at (562) 942-3521 or via E-Mail at bakerbo@mail.northgrum.com.

202d MI Battalion

The design elements of the crest symbolize the unit's mission and capabilities. The crest's colors, oriental blue and silver gray, are the colors traditionally associated with military intelligence. The knight's helmet is adapted from the device of the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade. It refers to the unit's parentage and symbolizes counterintelligence activities. The flash denotes speed and electronic warfare. The torch signifies a guardian of treasures and symbolizes security and strength. The unit's motto is "conlige et profice" (collect and exploit).

The 202d Military Intelligence Battalion was activated on 2 October 1982 at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, as a subordinate element of the 513th MI Brigade. The subordinate units that comprise the 202d MI Battalion have a long and distinguished history of service to the nation, including participation in the Pacific Theater of World War II, the Korean conflict, Vietnam, and Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, RESTORE HOPE, JOINT ENDEAVOR, and JOINT GUARD.

Since its activation, the 202d MI Battalion has developed into an echelons-above-corps battalion capable of rapid deployment into a bare-base hostile environment to provide theater-level sustained counterintelligence and interrogation support for Army elements of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The Battalion's focus is on Southwest Asia and South and Central America, both challenging and complex areas of the world.

The Battalion's participation in the Bright Star series of exercises from 1993 to 1997, and in the Gallant Eagle exercises in 1986 and 1988, added realism to training by defining missions and requirements for operations. Additionally, the Battalion deploys soldiers for intelligence operations and training to countries throughout Southwest Asia and South and Central America, including Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Panama, Haiti, and Honduras.

The 202d MI Battalion's participation in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990 and 1991 reinforced the meaning of its motto, "Collect and Exploit." The Battalion provided timely, quality interrogation and multidiscipline counterintelligence support to the theater command and its subordinate units. Successful participation in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Joint Task Force-Haiti have placed the Battalion in the forefront of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection in peacekeeping operations, and other stability and support operations.

On 1 June 1994, the 202d MI Battalion's colors were uncased at Fort Gordon, Georgia, the new home of the "Deuce." The relocation to Georgia has helped to improve the Battalion's relations with the primary sources of its taskings, CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM, by placing the unit geographically closer to Florida.

The Battalion today is the culmination of many outstanding leaders, years of experience, and the dedication and efforts of thousands of soldiers. In the future, the 202d MI Battalion expects to continue to be the leading edge in Army HUMINT at the joint and theater levels.

<p style="text-align:center">DEUCE!</p>

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